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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Heather Elizabeth Marek 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
September 2018 
 
Title: Criminalizing Our Way to Racial Equality? An Empirical Look at Hate Regulation. 
 
 
Does regulating hate promote racial equality? This dissertation proposes a method 
for beginning an empirical examination into the benefits and burdens of anti-hate laws. 
The effects of criminalization are particularly important given the U.S. history of 
racialized and colorblind justice and some evidence indicating criminalization may harm 
racial minorities. 
Chapter 2 examines whether hate crime laws have the unintended consequence of 
promoting racial inequality by contributing to racial disparities in arrests. It finds that 
while police are more likely to recognize assaults as hate crimes when the suspects are 
white, African Americans are nonetheless significantly overrepresented among hate 
crime arrestees.  
Chapter 3 examines how race affects victim perception of potential hate crimes, 
and how this, in turn, affects police response. While research suggests people tend to 
have a preconceived notion of the quintessential hate crime in which African Americans 
are victims, it also shows a negative racial bias in which people ascribe greater 
culpability and are more punitive towards African Americans. This study looks at how 
people act under the real-world stresses of crime. Findings provide evidence of a 
tendency to label African Americans as hate crime offenders and to report them to police 
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at significantly higher rates. Further, while African American suspects experience 
relatively high arrest rates generally, the magnitude of this effect is significantly greater 
for hate crimes.  
Chapter 4 explores the nefarious uses of hate crime laws, examining how they 
may be weaponized to inoculate police and undermine movements for racial justice. 
Specifically, it looks at the case of “Blue Lives Matter” legislation, which extends hate 
crime protections to police. Findings reject the officer safety rationale: States with BLM 
proposals do not differ significantly from other states in terms of violence against police. 
However, African American arrests do predict these bills, indicating they are a 
continuation of past police repression. Further research is needed to fully understand how 
officials enforce hate regulations, and the reverberations of this enforcement on society. 
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CHAPTER I 
CRIMINALIZING OUR WAY TO RACIAL EQUALITY?  
AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT HATE REGULATION 
I. Introduction 
What is the role of government in addressing hateful expression or conduct? Does 
greater government intervention address racial subordination and persecution, thereby 
creating an environment in which equal citizenship can be realized? Alternatively, does 
invoking and empowering the government result in abuse of power and institutionalized 
racial repression? How can we effectively address hate and promote racial equality?   
Answering these questions is no simple task. This is partially because it requires 
balancing the benefits and burdens of individual liberty and government regulation. Such 
inquiries are often normative; they have moral and ideological dimensions and involve 
subjective value judgments. Compounding these difficulties is the lack of systematic 
empirical research to inform the discussion.  
This dissertation proposes a method for beginning a social scientific examination into 
the benefits and burdens of regulating hate. It does so by identifying a type of regulation, 
hate crime, and narrowly focusing on a particular type of burden, penal enforcement. This 
burden is of particular interest given the United States history of racialized and colorblind 
justice and some evidence indicating criminalization may, in fact, work to the detriment 
of racial minorities. Thus, this dissertation will examine who bears the burden of 
criminalization under these provisions. This research examines hate crime enforcement at 
its earliest phases: victim reports and police responses. It further examines police 
responses by looking into how they may weaponize anti-hate laws to ward off legitimate 
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criticism and oversight. The findings serve as a small but important piece of the empirical 
puzzle regarding whether regulating hate actually promotes racial equality. 
II. Addressing Hate: A State Minimalist v. State Interventionist Approach 
 A longstanding division exists in liberal thought regarding the extent to which 
regulating hate advances freedom and equality (Fiss 1996). Nineteenth century liberalism 
focused on individual liberty from government intrusion. However, there was a shift in 
perspective beginning with the abolition of slavery, and later, the decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954). Equality became central to liberal ideology. This perspective 
called for greater state intervention (e.g., federal courts overseeing school desegregation; 
the creation of an Office for Civil Rights to ensure compliance with federal 
antidiscrimination law). The demand for a more heavy-handed government challenges 
the traditional liberal commitment to state minimalism. This newer strain of liberalism 
insists, under certain circumstances, liberty must give way to efforts to address social 
stigmatization and subordination. It views unencumbered individual autonomy as a force 
of oppression.  
 The liberal fissure is most exemplified in the context of hate speech. One the one 
hand, free speech advocates defend strong individual freedoms, arguing robust expressive 
rights ultimately protect politically and socially marginal groups and are foundational to 
free thought and democratic self-governance (see, e.g., Chemerinsky and Gillman 2017; 
Stone 2004; Romero 2017; Cole 2017; Greenwald 2017). They assert, among other 
things, that history and experience have taught us the importance of strong protections, 
which developed as result of government overreach including the Sedition Act, the 
McCarthy era, and the repression of civil rights advocacy and anti-war protests. They are 
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deeply skeptical that the government can be trusted with the power to decide what speech 
is and is not permissible. Moreover, free speech advocates contend a robust First 
Amendment has been particularly important to racial minorities and activists for racial 
equality, who have relied on non-violent discourse as a major tool to fight oppression. 
These individual freedoms have created and preserved a space for social change and 
racial equality. Under this approach, universal free speech rights have benefitted racial 
minorities. On the other hand, advocates for greater government suppression counter 
unfettered free speech is harmful to minorities and undermines principles of the Equal 
Protection Clause, as well as the First Amendment (see, e.g., Matsuda 1993; Lawrence 
1993; Delgado 1993; MacKinnon 1993; Ogletree 1996; Tsesis 1999; Park 2017). They 
argue, in part, that hate speech promotes racial hierarchy and violence, or, at the very 
least, occurs within a context of violence and acts as an implicit threat and dignitary 
affront. Hate speech creates a climate in which minorities cannot safely engage in free 
expression, work, school, and other democratic pursuits. Thus, unchecked hateful rhetoric 
undermines the promise of Brown to address stigma and subordination and to promote 
equality. From this standpoint, the First Amendment has, at times, been harmful to racial 
minorities because of its blindness to social power. 
The liberal tension between state minimalism and interventionism extends to the 
context of regulating hateful conduct; we address similar questions regarding the role of 
government. It is true that hate crime laws differ significantly from proposed prohibitions 
on hate speech, namely because they purport to punish acts rather than expression 
(Jenness and Grattet 2001; Wisconsin v. Mitchell 1993). Hate crime laws merely provide 
new or enhanced penalties for already prohibited behavior when it is motivated by the 
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victim’s real or perceived membership in a protected class (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, or national origin) (Levin 2002). However, despite these 
differences, regulating hate crime resembles regulating hate speech in a few noteworthy 
regards. First, it strives to address stigmatization and subordination by stopping the 
expression of hate. Second, it punishes objectionable ideas because it treats otherwise 
similar acts more severely due to the words and thoughts ascribed to them, and it usually 
relies on words (i.e., speech) as evidence of a violation (Jenness and Grattet 2001; 
Gellman 1991; Jacobs and Potter 1998). Finally, it involves the same sort of government 
intervention: penal enforcement. In sum, like proposed hate speech laws, hate crimes 
strive to promote equal citizenship by showing zero tolerance for racial subjugation by 
invoking the criminal justice system. Accordingly, we contend with the tension between 
liberty and equality, as well as grapple with the question of whether the government can 
be trusted to regulate hate or whether such enforcement will ultimately lead to the 
repression of racial minorities.   
III. Research Question: Does Criminalizing Hate Promote Racial Equality? 
It is an empirical question whether invoking and empowering government to regulate 
hate promotes or undermines racial equality.  Yet, few scholars have systematically 
examined the societal burdens or benefits regulating hate or attempted to compare them.  
In the hate speech context, the lack of systematic research may be due, in part, to 
methodological barriers: namely, how can we measure the effects of stricter hate speech 
regulations in the U.S. context when they are constitutionally forbidden and do not exist 
(see, e.g., Colin v. Smith 1978; Cohen v. California 1971; Gooding v. Wilson 1972; 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul 1992)? The answer requires testing a counterfactual, and is therefore 
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inherently speculative and difficult to operationalize. However, we can evaluate hate 
crime laws because they are both legal and prevalent in the United States. Accordingly, 
this dissertation examines who bears the burden of criminalizing hateful conduct.   
Criminalization is an important metric for understanding the consequences of 
regulating hate for racial equality because it involves a particular type of burden racial 
minorities have disproportionately borne. Thus, some scholars have highlighted the irony 
of relying on the criminal justice system as an avenue for promoting racial justice 
(Franklin 2002). Though the penal system is often invoked to solve social problems, as a 
historical matter, it has overwhelmingly been a purveyor of racial inequality. Regulating 
hate speech necessarily involves a high degree of trust in the criminal justice system that 
is, perhaps, undeserved. Given its record of racial subjugation, a little caution is 
warranted. Criminalizing hate may have the unintended consequence of creating another 
vehicle through which racial minorities are funneled into the carceral system. This 
section outlines mechanisms in the criminal justice system contributing to racial 
inequality. It then considers how these structural problems, unaddressed, may lead to 
similar racialized outcomes in the hate crime context.  
a. The Criminal Justice System Institutionalizes Racial Hierarchy 
Since the abolition of slavery, the criminal justice system has been the major legal 
institution producing and reproducing racial hierarchy in the United States. It has 
facilitated and legitimized the mass incarceration, enslavement, disenfranchisement, and 
discrimination of racial minorities, legally enshrining a racial caste system (Alexander 
2012). This section describes the connection between the criminal justice system and 
racial inequality, providing a backdrop for understanding why criminalizing hate-driven 
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speech and conduct may actually harm racial minorities.  
The criminal justice system promotes inequality at every step, including 
lawmaking, enforcement, sentencing, and corrections. While laws that explicitly 
discriminate on the basis of race are generally impermissible, legislators continue to enact 
race-neutral statutes to control racial minorities. A significant example can be found in 
the “War on Drugs,” which arose as part of a broader strategy to promote “law and order” 
and capitalize on fears surrounding civil disobedience, affirmative action, and integration 
(Alexander 2012). Further, legislatures have criminalized a wide range of conduct such 
that most people violate the law regularly, making criminality ubiquitous. This gives 
police and prosecutors broad authority to enforce it when and against whom they see fit, 
and the judiciary is highly deferential to these officials, providing very little oversight 
(Carbado 2017; Carbado 2002). Social psychological research suggests such ambiguity 
and discretion facilitate racial bias (see Girvan and Marek 2016 for a review of the 
literature). Sure enough, racial discrimination is widespread in police encounters – 
including stops, searches, arrests, and uses of force – even though bias-based policing is 
not efficacious (see, Fagen et al. 2009; Harris 2002; Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice 2016; Civil Rights Division 2015; Civil Rights Division and U.S. 
Attorney’s Office 2017).  
Likewise, disparities occur at every prosecutorial decision-making point – 
including detention, dropping or reducing charges, and plea offers – even though racial 
minorities are more likely to benefit from dismissals (Kutateladze, et al. 2014; Berdijo 
2018). Thereafter, race greatly determines the sentence one receives. Notably, in a meta-
analysis of 85 studies, researchers found blacks and Latinos were sentenced more 
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punitively than whites regardless of criminal history or seriousness of offense (Mitchell 
and MacKenzie 2004).  Blacks also serve a greater portion of their sentences in prison 
than whites, awaiting parole for a much longer time (Huebner and Bynam 2008).  
Unequal treatment in the criminal justice system contributes greatly to social 
inequality overall. It has led to the mass incarceration of minorities, with nearly ten 
percent of black individuals in the United States in prison or jail or under probation or 
parole supervision (Warren et al. 2009). Criminalization has tremendous collateral 
consequences, as well. In the short term, arrests, court appearances, and jail time get in 
the way of going to school, finding and maintaining work, attending social service 
appointments, and other activities that allow a person to pursue a stable and prosperous 
existence (Fisher et al. 2015). Even the most minor of crimes can have serious and long-
term ramifications, including health problems, as well as the loss or denial of 
employment, housing, government benefits, mental and drug treatment, or social services 
(Adock et al. 2016; Massoglia 2008; Alexander 2012; Pager 2008; National Law Center 
on Homelessness and Poverty 2015). Involvement in the justice system carries with it 
hefty fines and fees, and failure to pay those debts can result in suspension of a driver’s 
license, poor credit, and even incarceration (Shapiro 2014; Civil Rights Division 2015). 
Individuals accused or convicted of certain crimes face banishment from geographic 
areas through civil injunctions (Davis 1998; Becket and Herbert 2009). Criminalization 
also directly impacts basic rights of citizenship, including (for immigrants) the ability to 
be lawfully present or become a U.S. citizen, and (for U.S. citizens) the ability to vote or 
serve on juries (Alexander 2012; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227, 1182). For all of these reasons, 
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criminalization itself increases the likelihood of recidivism, future incarceration, and 
extreme destitution (Gowan 2002; National Healthcare for Homeless Council 2013). 
These harsh realities undermine the legitimacy of the justice system itself. Sure 
enough, there are notable differences regarding the extent to which groups trust the law 
and its administration. Black and Hispanic populations perceive police bias as a problem 
at a much higher rate than white populations, with a lower proportion of minorities 
attributing police action to legitimate criminality (Weitzer and Touch 2005; Weitzer 
2000). Similarly, blacks are much more likely to view the criminal justice system overall 
as unfair (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). These negative experiences and perceptions have 
broad ramifications. Importantly, they affect whether individuals report crime 
victimization (Zaykowski 2010). Further, research suggests racism in the penal system 
discourages minorities from participating in civil cases (Greene 2015). Blacks are 
particularly skeptical of the notion that they can receive equal treatment, and they have 
diminished confidence in the court’s handling of their cases (Brooks 2001). It is not 
hyperbole to suggest that many black people see the justice system – whether criminal or 
civil – as a source of oppression more so than a place of refuge.   
In sum, significant scholarship has highlight the ways in which racial bias 
permeates every level of the criminal justice system, including the creation of laws and 
their implementation. Moreover, the criminal justice system is so integrated into other 
social institutions, like voting, education, employment, and housing, that it promotes 
racial hierarchy on a societal level. These problems are systemic and profound, and may 
influence anti-hate statutes and their administration.  
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b. The Contradiction: How Can an Institution of Racial Injustice Promote 
Racial Justice?  
 
The need to combat racist conduct is uncontroversial, but, in light of the foregoing 
discussion, there appears to be a mismatch of means and ends. In criminalizing hate, we 
are invoking a system of racial injustice to promote racial justice. The criminal justice 
system is a compromised institution: Its severe systemic shortcomings – namely, over-
criminalization, lack of judicial oversight, and unchecked executive discretion – have 
created a climate wherein racial bias thrives. During a time of heightened awareness 
among scholars, policymakers, and advocates for the need to limit its reach, how can we 
simultaneously argue for its fortification? This section outlines some of the evidence 
suggesting the criminalization of hate-driven speech and conduct may actually harm 
racial minorities. 
Some may conceptualize hate crime statutes as merely another form of 
antidiscrimination law (see, e.g., MacKinnon 1993; Levin 2002). Through this 
perspective, it is easy to understand the appeal of such regulations. Antidiscrimination 
laws have done much to promote racial equality in a variety of contexts (employment, 
public accommodations, education, credit, mortgages, housing, and voting) and also 
prohibited interference with important civil rights (voting, obtaining government funded 
benefits or services, accessing employment, participation in jury service, enrollment in 
public education, interstate travel, and the benefits of various types of public 
accommodations) (Reskin 2012; Levin 2002). However, these laws have been largely 
civil, or they criminalized narrow categories of conduct that specifically targeted racial 
minorities. For example, an employer who discriminates against an employee will not 
face penal sanctions like prison or a criminal record, even if punitive damages are 
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awarded. Those laws that do involve penal sanctions, like burning a cross on the property 
of another without consent, address a very particular behavior and context, and leave 
little room for ambiguity, discretion, and biased attitudes among government officials.  
Anti-hate regulations therefore differ significantly from other forms of equality-
promoting legislation. They involve criminalization, setting into motion the racialized 
criminal justice system that has been so devastating to minority communities. Further, 
anti-hate regulations involve a high degree of ambiguity. No bright line rules exist to 
determine whether words or actions involve hate. Such ambiguous standards invite 
inconsistent and arbitrary applications of the law because they fail to provide explicit 
direction as to the correct outcome in a case. (Girvan 2016). Without clear criteria, 
decision makers must rely on their common sense, attitudes, and stereotypes, with 
potentially capricious results. 
Accordingly, research on hate crime reveals variation in its enforcement. 
Differences exist across police department in policies, procedures, training, and resource 
allocation (Franklin 2002; Bell 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001).  In addition, 
implementation depends on subjective factors, like the attitudes, beliefs, and practices of 
individual officers (Franklin 2002; Bell 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001). Officers have a 
particularly high level of discretion when it comes to enforcing hate crime laws because it 
is difficult to prove that hate or bias is the primary motivation behind a crime. This 
ambiguity introduces a high level of subjectivity into the process to determining whether 
a hate crime occurred, inviting arbitrary and uneven application of penalties (Franklin 
2002). It is particularly difficult to determine whether a hate crime occurred because it 
will always involve conduct that would be criminal regardless of the bias motive (Jenness 
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and Grattet 2001). Thus, police rely on their preconceived notions of what a ‘typical’ hate 
crime looks like and eliminate offenses that do not meet these expectations, such as cases 
involving drugs, fights, neighbor or domestic disputes, or that otherwise have multiple 
potential motives (Bell 2002; Jenness and Grattet 2001). Police also evaluate the victims 
to determine whether some explanation other bias may be involved. For example, police 
may be less likely to attribute victimization to bias when the target lives in a poor 
neighborhood or has a criminal record (Bell 2002). In sum, hate crime classifications 
depend greatly on the meaning-making processes of police (Jenness and Grattet 2001).   
Additionally, anti-hate laws operate within the confines of a colorblind 
constitution, and are therefore incapable of recognizing racial dynamics, power 
asymmetries, and other social context. Colorblind jurisprudence pretends racial equality 
has already been realized and fails to acknowledge the vastly different circumstances of 
groups in society (Gotanda 1991). Under this approach, the law is skeptical of all racial 
distinctions, regardless of whether the government action favors or disfavors racial 
minorities, promotes equality or inequality, or corrects or continues historical racism 
(Bell 2008). Thus, it greatly hinders judicial intervention that could address historical 
subordination, and it ignores the central role of race in social relations, thereby 
legitimizing unfair and disparate treatment in situations where racism is difficult to prove 
(Carbado 2002; Butler 2010). This perspective, which only recognizes explicit – not 
subtle or structural – forms of racism, enables severe racial disparities to persist 
throughout criminal justice process, including in policing (Whren v. United States 1996), 
jury selection (Batson v. Kentucky 1986), and sentencing (McClesky v. Kemp 1987).  
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Likewise, anti-hate laws apply with equal vigor to all groups, regardless of their 
particular histories and contemporary place in society. Notably, hate crime statutes 
protect universal categories, like race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, etc., as 
opposed to particular groups within a category, like blacks, Jews, homosexuals, etc. 
(Jenness and Grattet 2001). Under this acontextual and ahistorical scheme, advocates for 
racial justice have been characterized as hate groups. For instance, the FBI has identified 
black activists as “Black Identity Extremists.” (Winter and Weinberger 2017). Similarly, 
lawmakers have signaled their desire to designate Black Lives Matter a hate group 
(Phillips 2017; Cohen 2016). True to the colorblind anti-discrimination framework, the 
mere acknowledgement of race is itself deemed racist. Even critiques of police are 
suspect. The FBI was particularly concerned about criticisms of law enforcement, which 
it alleged fueled anti-police sentiment and violence (Winter and Weinberger 2017). 
Indeed, black activism around policing has led some jurisdictions to give law 
enforcement protected class status under hate crime statutes (Craven 2017). This creates 
an inverted reality wherein police killing of unarmed black people – which the United 
Nations has likened to lynching – is not labeled hate activity, but protesting it is (Miles 
2016).  
Given these considerations – namely, that anti-hate laws criminalize groups without 
taking into account their social positions – it is unsurprising that enforcement thereof may 
reflect disparities seen throughout the criminal justice system. For example, in the late 
1990s, blacks comprised a disproportionate contingent of hate crime offenders according 
to FBI statistics (Franklin 2002). Data available in Florida, New York, and California 
revealed similar trends (Franklin 2002). In addition, a sizeable portion of the victims was 
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white. Similarly, research indicates police are more likely to become involved in 
incidents targeting white victims than those targeting black victims (Wilson and Ruback 
2003). These disparities may reflect police bias or differences in the willingness of 
certain groups to contact the police for assistance. Data from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey reveal that, while minority victimizations are generally less likely 
to be reported, the magnitude of this effect is far greater for racial hate crimes 
(Zaykowski 2010). Other research shows that hate crime enforcement depends on a 
place’s legacy of racism. A jurisdiction’s history of lynching, and law enforcement’s 
failure to protect minority groups, is predictive of contemporary law enforcement 
responses to hate-motivated crimes (King, Messner, and Baller 2009). Specifically, past 
lynching is negatively correlated with hate crime law compliance, i.e., enforcement and 
reporting by policing agencies.  
In sum, some evidence suggests anti-hate laws benefit whites more than racial 
minorities and, conversely, burden racial minorities more than whites. Anti-hate laws, 
despite good intentions, may be nothing more than a microcosm of the larger criminal 
justice system, which, as discussed, promotes racial inequality.  Therefore, an honest 
assessment of anti-hate regulation requires looking into the consequences of 
criminalization.  
IV. An Empirical Look at Hate Crime Laws 
Can we trust the government to regulate hate, or will it lead to the mass 
criminalization of racial minorities? Despite the longstanding interest and obvious 
significance of this issue, we lack systematic research. This is a particularly important 
question given the United States history of racialized and colorblind justice and some 
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evidence indicating criminalization may harm racial minorities. This dissertation will 
therefore examine who bears the burden of criminalization under these provisions. It will 
provide important empirical evidence pertaining to the question of whether regulating 
hate actually promotes racial equality, though much more research will be necessary to 
answer the question. This dissertation is but a small first step.  
Chapter 2 initiates the empirical exploration into the potentially perverse impacts of 
hate crime enforcement, looking at how police handle these crimes. Specifically, it 
examines whether hate crime laws have the unintended consequence of promoting racial 
inequality by contributing to racial disparities in arrests. It proposes and tests the 
following theory regarding hate crime enforcement: While police recognize whites as 
more likely to commit hate-motivated offenses, they nevertheless arrest African 
Americans at disproportionately high rates due to biases that overwhelm the criminal 
justice system. It does so by looking at police-level decisions regarding who has 
committed a hate crime, examining whether any racial or ethnic groups are 
overrepresented among hate crime offenders, and comparing these disparities to those 
among non-hate offenders. The data set is comprised of statistics from the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Report, innovatively combining the NIBRS and Hate Crime Data series. It also 
relies on demographic information from the Decennial Censuses of 2000 and 2010. The 
sample includes incidents of intimidation, simple assault, and aggravated assault for years 
2000-15. Preliminary findings suggest there is cause for concern. While police are less 
likely to designate an assault a hate crime for African American suspects than white, 
African Americans are nonetheless significantly overrepresented among hate crime 
offenders. These disparities persist regardless of broader community-level enforcement 
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patterns, though they are significantly lower among hate crimes than comparable non-
hate crimes. Major disparities also exist among American Indians. The effects on 
Hispanics remain unknown. Further research is needed to fully understand how police – 
as well as other criminal justice officials – enforce hate crime laws, and the 
reverberations of this enforcement on society. 
Chapter 3 continues the exploration into enforcement. It examines how race affects 
victim perception of potential hate crimes, and how this, in turn, affects police response. 
Research suggests people tend to have a preconceived notion of the quintessential hate 
crime in which African Americans are victims. At the same time, other research indicates 
the public and criminal justice system tend to have a preconceived notion of the 
prototypical criminal, in which African Americans are seen as the offender. This study 
asks which holds true in real life scenarios: are African Americans more likely to be seen 
victims or offenders overall? It proposes that, when individuals personally encounter the 
stresses of a real (rather than hypothetical) crime, negative biases prevail. Victims will 
most likely identify an incident as a hate crime and report it to police when the 
perpetrator is African American, and police will treat suspects more punitively by 
arresting them when they are African American. To test this theory, I look at victim 
accounts of their recent victimizations. The data set is comprised of statistics from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey for years 2003-15, as 
well as demographic information from the Decennial Census of 2000 and 2010. Findings 
provide clear evidence of a tendency to label African Americans as hate crime offenders 
and report them to police at significantly higher rates. Further, while African American 
suspects experience relatively high arrest rates generally, these disparities increase 
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precipitously for purported hate crimes. Other non-white offenders and Hispanics are also 
treated more harshly. At a minimum, this analysis demonstrates the need for further 
research to show the potentially perverse consequences of hate crime enforcement, and 
whether this approach is the most efficacious means for addressing bigotry and violence.   
Chapter 4 explores the nefarious uses of hate crime laws, examining how they may be 
weaponized to inoculate police, undermine movements for racial justice, and perpetuate 
racial repression. Specifically, it looks at the case of so-called Blue Lives Matter 
legislation. Since 2016, a wave of states has introduced bills into their legislatures that 
propose extending hate crime protections to police. Hate crime laws have, since their 
inception, aimed to protect historically oppressed groups. Police do not fit that 
description, so why provide hate crime protections to police? This chapter tests two 
explanations for the introduction of these laws. First, it considers conventional wisdom 
that police face heightened or new violence that justifies new protections. Second, it 
examines whether past police repression predicts the Blue Lives Matter bills, indicating 
they are a continuation of such practices. This chapter argues that Blue Lives Matter 
laws, unlike other types of anti-hate legislation, aim to undermine equality rather than 
promote it by suppressing movements for racial justice. The data set is comprised of five 
data sources: legislation introduced at state legislatures in the years 2016 and 2017; the 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted series from the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program (UCR); Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS); the Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race series from the UCR; and the U.S. Census 
Bureau Decennial Censuses of 1990, 2000, 2010. Findings reject the officer safety 
rationale for hate crime protections. States in which lawmakers proposed BLM 
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protections do not differ significantly from other states in terms of violence against 
police. However, states with more repressive police practices – as measured through 
arrests of African Americans – are significantly more likely to introduce legislation 
extending hate crime protections to law enforcement. The results indicate states 
proposing BLM laws are those in which police have historically exercised broad powers 
and wish to continue doing so. This suggests states are using hate crime laws – which 
mean to protect the vulnerable – to protect the powerful. It appears states are 
weaponizing civil rights laws to suppress movements for racial justice. Further research 
is needed to fully understand the social context of these laws and their future 
consequences for racial equality. 
Chapter 5 synthesizes these findings, and situates them within the broader question of 
whether criminalization of hate perpetuates racial inequality. This chapter also seriously 
considers the limitations of the research. Notably, even if criminalization 
disproportionately burdens people of color, regulating hate may nevertheless have 
redeeming equality-promoting effects. In other words, the inquiry does not stop here. We 
cannot weigh the burdens and benefits of regulation without a full accounting of what 
those entail. This chapter will explore these limitations, as well as other areas ripe for 
future exploration.  
In conclusion, this dissertation draws attention to the need for greater empirical 
evidence regarding the potential impacts of regulating hate. It proposes a method for 
beginning a social scientific examination by identifying a type of regulation that targets 
hate driven conduct and narrowly focusing on a particular type of burden which has 
historically afflicted racial minorities, penal enforcement. It then modestly embarks on 
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this empirical journey by examining enforcement at its earliest phases: victim reports and 
police responses. It further examines police responses by looking into how they may 
weaponize anti-hate laws to ward off legitimate criticism and oversight. This dissertation 
is a small but nevertheless necessary first step into the empirical inquiry regarding 
whether regulating hate actually promotes racial equality.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:  
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN HATE CRIME ARRESTS 
 
I. Introduction 
Hate crimes have reentered the public spotlight as of late. Laws prohibiting such acts 
were largely passed in the latter part of the twentieth century out of a convergence of civil 
rights, women’s rights, the gay and lesbian rights, and victim’s rights movements. 
(Jenness and Grattet 2001). They aimed to raise awareness about bigotry directed at 
minority groups and respond to violence stemming from it. Recently, many advocates, 
including prominent groups like the Southern Poverty Law Center, the NAACP, the Anti-
Defamation League, and the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights, among others, have 
reported an “explosion of bias incidents,” due to a political climate that permits – or even 
encourages – hate (see, e.g., Southern Poverty Law Center 2017; National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, “Monitoring and Preventing Hate Crimes”; Anti-
Defamation League 2018; Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights, “Stop Hate Project”). 
Like the anti-hate movement decades ago, these groups look to the criminal justice 
system, particularly law enforcement, as a primary means for addressing the problem.  
But what might be the unintended consequences of demanding greater police 
intervention? Many groups sounding the alarm and hailing the criminal justice system 
have at other times led the charge to dismantle that same system because of its role in 
promoting racial inequality (see, e.g., National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, “Pathways”; Southern Poverty Law Center 2018; Lawyers Committee 
for Civil Rights, “Criminal Justice”). Police have faced particularly fierce and intense 
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scrutiny as anecdotes and studies surface exposing discriminatory treatment towards 
people of color and people in poverty or mental health crisis, with regards to stops, 
searches, arrests, and, most notably, violence (see, Fagen et al. 2009; Harris 2002; Civil 
Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 2016; Civil Rights Division 2015; 
Civil Rights Division and U.S. Attorney’s Office 2017). Police face a crisis of legitimacy, 
in large part due to their systemic racism (Vitale 2017). Can the institution of policing 
effectively address racial subordination, or will greater police involvement translate into 
higher numbers of minority individuals (particularly African Americans) entering the 
criminal justice system, as has historically been the case? (See, e.g., Alexander 2012).  
This chapter explores whether anti-hate enforcement, which purports to promote 
racial equality, works to the detriment of racial minorities by contributing to their 
disproportionate criminalization. As discussed in the Chapter 1, racial disparities exist at 
every decision-making point in the criminal justice system, from police, to prosecutors, to 
judges, to juries, to parole boards. Seeing whether these disparities persist in the hate 
crime context requires a similar examination of key decision-making points. The 
following study starts this inquiry by focusing on police. It theorizes that, while police 
recognize whites as more likely to commit hate-motivated offenses, they nevertheless 
arrest African Americans at disproportionately high rates due to biases that overwhelm 
the criminal justice system. Using multilevel models nesting incidents of assault within 
communities (cities or counties), controlling for incident-level characteristics (severity of 
the offense) and community-level factors (such as racial demographics and racial 
inequality), I test this theory by modeling whether suspect race or ethnicity determines 
when police label an incident a hate crime. I then examine the extent to which racial and 
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ethnic groups are overrepresented among hate crime offenders, and how this measures up 
to inequality in the criminal justice system outside the hate crime context. This shows 
whether biases within the criminal justice system permeate hate crime enforcement, 
despite good intentions. Police are a particularly important focal point because of their 
central role in enforcing hate crime laws and acting as gatekeepers to the system. 
Moreover, they have been widely regarded as a source of racial subjugation among 
scholars, advocates, and activists concerned with racial equality. Thus, this investigation 
is both necessary and timely.  
II. Methods 
a. Data Sources 
This analysis employs four sources of data: the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR); Hate 
Crime Data from the UCR; the U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census; and the Law 
Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk (LEAIC). Each serves a necessary function. 
The UCR Hate Crime Data provides statistics on incidents of hate crime offenses, 
whereas NIBRS offers information on comparable non-hate offenses. The Decennial 
Census has community-level demographic information that enables the calculation of 
crime rates for the different racial or ethnic groups and the exploration of relationships 
between city/county characteristics and enforcement. Finally, LEAIC provides linkage 
variables that facilitate merging of UCR and Census data. These data sources together 
allow the analysis of hate crime on multiple levels, collectively providing information 
about both the incidents and the communities in which they occur. Significantly, 
incident-level characteristics include details on the offender (race) and the offense (the 
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type and whether it involved bias). The community-level characteristics include 
demographic and socioeconomic attributes (like racial breakdown, median income, 
educational attainment, and unemployment and poverty rates). This multilevel analysis 
will reveal the extent to which incident and community-level characteristics influence 
incidence of hate crime, among whom, and the odds a crime is deemed hate-driven. Each 
data source is described in greater detail below. 
i. UCR NIBRS and Hate Crime Data 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) compiles the UCR. City, county, and 
state law enforcement agencies nationwide submit data on crimes known to police in 
their respective jurisdictions. Under the UCR, hate crimes are defined as those that 
“manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, or disability” (Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Hate 
Crime Data 2015 Codebook).  
NIBRS includes information at the incident level, including characteristics of the 
crime, offender, victim, and reporting agency. The UCR’s main Summary Reporting 
System does not include incident-level information. The FBI implemented NIBRS in 
1991, and agencies have incrementally shifted to that method of reporting. As of 2015, 
6,648 agencies reported via NIBRS, a little more than one third of those participating in 
the UCR overall (“FBI Releases 2015 Crime Statistics from the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System, Encourages Transition”). These agencies collectively covered 
approximately 93,509,938 of the U.S. population, according to agency population 
estimates provided by the LEIAC (discussed in subsection ii below). Only 2,988 agencies 
participated in 2000, collectively covering 42,919,325 of the U.S. population. The 
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agencies participating in NIBRS cannot be presumed random. As a result, NIBRS is not a 
representative sample of crime in the United States (ICPSR 2009). Yet, it is the only 
available data source that allows a direct comparison of incidents at the agency level.  
Thus, NIBRS creates a window – albeit one with a limited and imperfect view – into 
whether and when police determine crimes as having a hate motive. 
The Hate Crime Data series is a separate segment of the UCR. It began in 1990 
with passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, and became a permanent feature of 
the UCR in 1996 under the Church Arson Prevent Act of 1996 (Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program Data: National Incident-Based Reporting System, 2015). It similarly 
includes incident-level information pertaining to offenses, offenders, and victims. The 
overwhelming majority of agencies reporting hate crimes do so via this system. However, 
in 2000, Hate Crime Data only included data from 1,892 agencies, whose jurisdictions 
covered 134,900,000 of the U.S. population. In 2015, it included data from 1,742 
agencies, whose jurisdictions covered 141,600,000 of the U.S. population. Most agencies 
report no hate crime at all; FBI hate crime statistics come from a fraction of agencies 
nationwide. (see, e.g., Hate Crime Data 2016).  
Comparisons between hate and non-hate statistics are rare, likely because 
agencies overwhelmingly report them separately via the Hate Crime Data and NIBRS 
systems respectively in different formats. Thus, this study is innovative in bringing 
together two typically siloed data sources, thereby providing a more complete picture of 
hate crime enforcement within the criminal justice system. 
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ii. U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census 
The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the Decennial Census, surveying households 
across the country to provide, among other things, population estimates. Pertinent to this 
study, the Decennial Census provides demographic information on households and 
geographic areas, including racial and ethnic composition and socioeconomic attributes 
(median income, poverty rates, educational attainment, and unemployment rates).  Table 
2-1 provides descriptive statistics for these geographic units of analysis.  
Table 2-1: Geographic Units of Analysis (Cities and Counties) 
Total Number of Units 6,455 
  
    
 
Mean Min Max 
Number Incidents 26,568 1 436,446 
Population (Count) 91,395 8 3,376,741 
White (%) 83.46% 1.52% 100.00% 
African American  (%) 7.26% 0.00% 95.31% 
Asian/PI  (%) 1.18% 0.00% 27.69% 
AI (%) 1.05% 0.00% 85.74% 
Data include only NIBRS reporting agencies, but include statistics from NIBRS and Hate 
Crime Data sources for those agencies. 
 
 
This study includes data from the 2000 and 2010 decennial censuses (Manson, et al. 
2017). UCR data from years 2000-2009 were paired with the 2000 census, and years 
2010-2015 the 2010 census. This means a lag exists between the decennial census and 
subsequent years. However, this lag exists across geographic areas. Decennial Census 
and UCR data were merged by city (FIPS place codes) for Census places, and by county 
(FIPS county codes) for non-place geographic areas (e.g., counties).   
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iii. LEIAC 
The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics creates the LEIAC. It contains common match 
keys for merging UCR and Census Bureau data. Linkage variables include the 
Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) code, Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS) codes for states, counties, and cities (places). For this study, the 2012 LEIAC 
linked UCR years 2010-2015 to 2010 Decennial Census data, and the 2000 LEIAC linked 
UCR years 2000-2009 to 2000 Decennial Census data. 
b. Sample 
This study includes UCR NIBRS and Hate Crime Data for the years 2000 through 
2015. All years are combined. The sample has only assault-related offenses: intimidation, 
simple assault, and aggravated assault. Several considerations prompted the decision to 
focus on these offenses. Notably, they comprise the majority of hate-related crimes, 
whereas the remaining incidents are diffuse. Hate Crime Data for this time period 
spanned 41 offense types, 58.53 percent assaults, 32.85 percent vandalism and 
destruction of property, and 9 percent the remaining 37 categories (each less than 2 
percent of cases respectively). Thus, these 37 offenses were eliminated due to sparseness 
among hate crime offenses. In addition, the nature of assaults is such that the offender’s 
race is usually known. This was true for 77 percent of cases in the Hate Crime Data. In 
contrast, vandalism and destruction of property indicated offender race in just 16 percent 
of cases, and was therefore excluded (see Table 2-2 for the distribution of offenses in the 
sample). 
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Table 2-2: Distribution of Offenses in Sample 
 
Intimidation 
Simple 
Assault 
Aggravated 
Assault Total 
     Non-Hate 2,625,791 9,212,060 2,193,087 14,030,938 
 
18.71% 65.66% 15.63% 100% 
     Hate 9,220 10,223 4,777 24,220 
 
38.07% 42.21% 19.72% 100% 
     Total 2,635,011 9,222,283 2,197,864 14,055,158 
 
18.75% 65.61% 15.64% 100% 
Data include only NIBRS reporting agencies, but include statistics from NIBRS and Hate 
Crime Data sources for those agencies. 
 
 
Some changes were required to ensure comparability between NIBRS and Hate 
Crime Data. First, since non-hate data only included NIBRS reporting agencies, the Hate 
Crime Data was similarly limited to NIBRS reporting agencies to prevent the influence of 
agency-level differences. Second, Hate Crime Data aggregates all offenders in a given 
incident, leaving the incident (not offender) as the unit of analysis. Thus, while NIBRS 
provided a within-incident breakdown of offenders, this information was collapsed to 
match the Hate Crime Data incident-level aggregation. Third, Hispanic was omitted from 
the entire data set because Hate Crime Data does not include that variable, and it appears 
in NIBRS only for years 2012 through 2015, and is rarely reported even then (see Table 
2-3 for a breakdown of the distribution of incidents by racial and ethnic category). 
Fourth, Hate Crime Data provides no racial/ethnic information on victims, and thus this 
information was removed altogether. All cases for which offender race is unknown were 
excluded from the analysis (1,230,657 cases dropped out of 15,285,815, constituting just 
8 percent of the sample). With all restrictions, the final sample equaled 14,055,158 
incidents. 
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Table 2-3: Distribution of Incidents in Sample by Racial Category of Offenders* 
 
White 
African 
American Asian/PI AI Multi Total 
       Non-Hate 8,681,862 4,962,928 85,858 105,073 195,217 14,030,938 
 
61.88% 35.37% 0.61% 0.75% 1.39% 100% 
       Hate 16,815 5,964 191 254 996 24,220 
 
69.43% 24.62% 0.79% 1.05% 4.11% 100% 
       Total 8,698,677 4,968,892 86,049 105,327 196,213 14,055,158 
 
61.89% 35.35% 0.61% 0.75% 1.4% 100% 
*Asian/PI includes Asian and Pacific Islanders. AI refers to American Indian. Multi 
refers to groups comprised of offenders of different racial identities. Data include only 
NIBRS reporting agencies, but include statistics from NIBRS and Hate Crime Data 
sources for those agencies. 
 
 
c. Measures 
This multilevel analysis will reveal the extent to which incident- and community-
level characteristics influence incidence of hate crime enforcement, among whom, and 
the odds a crime is deemed hate-driven. It involves two separate statistical tests: Bernouli 
and a negative binomial regressions.  
For the first series of Bernouli models, the dependent outcome is whether police 
designated an incident a hate crime or a not. Thus, incidents were categorized into a 
binary variable as either having a bias motive or the lack thereof. Blank and negative 
responses were coded as “0” to indicate police noted no bias, and all others were coded as 
“1” to indicate police positively identified a form of bias. This allows us to see how 
police labeled each incident, and whether various fixed effects predict either outcome.  
For the next Bernouli model, the dependent is whether the incident involved an 
African American suspect. For this test, incidents were categorized into a binary variable 
as either involving an African American suspect or not. This will show whether the 
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difference in African American representation among arrestees differs signficiantly 
between the hate and non-hate contexts.  
The negative binomial regressions then examine bias and non-bias crimes 
separately (those labeled “1” and then those labeled “0”), using counts of those incidents 
by geographic area to calculate incidence rates for every racial and ethnic group. This 
allows for a direct comparison of arrest rates for non-hate crimes and hate crimes, thereby 
illuminating whether similar racial/ethnic disparities occur in both contexts. 
The primary predictor of interest is offender race. Hate Crime Data aggregates the 
race of all offenders involved in a particular incident into a single group. If multiple 
offenders of one race are involved in a given incident, the race variable will reflect their 
shared group identity (e.g., African American, white, etc.). However, if the incident 
involves multiple offenders of more than one race, the race variable merely indicates the 
group was multiracial without a demographic breakdown. Thus, NIBRS data was coded 
to match the Hate Crime Data categories such that multiracial refers to groups of 
suspected assailants of different racial or ethnic identities. Both UCR data sets combine 
Asian and Pacific Islander offenders in years preceding 2012, and so the demographic 
groups were combined all years for consistency. 
Another important incident-level covariate is the severity of the offense. Severity 
of offense refers to the level of violence used in the assault, and was based on FBI 
definitions (“Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook”). Intimidation is the least severe, 
involving the use of threatening words or conduct without a weapon or actual physical 
attack. Simple assault is more severe, involving a physical attack but no weapon or 
serious bodily injury. Aggravated assault is the most severe, as it entails serious bodily 
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injury, and is often accompanied by the use of a weapon or other means likely to produce 
death or great bodily harm. These were coded as “1,” “2,” and “3,” respectively to create 
a categorical variable. 
The community-level characteristics of interest are population and racial 
inequality. Population allows for the calculation of arrest rates for each demographic 
group. The first series of Bernouli models do not include population because there was no 
theoretical reason to believe population sizes affects whether or not police label a crime 
as bias motivated. The negative binomial regression uses populations of each racial and 
ethnic category for the city or county wherein the law enforcement agency exists (based 
on place and county FIPS codes from the Decennial Censuses). Measurement of racial 
inequality required calculating dissimilarity between white and African American 
populations in a given geographic area (again using place and county FIPS codes) for 
median income, educational attainment, and unemployment. See Appendix A for these 
calculations. In brief, this involved calculating the ratios for income, educational 
attainment, and unemployment between African Americans and whites. Higher numbers 
on the index denote greater disparities between African Americans and whites in these 
combined categories. For income, a positive number indicates African Americans are 
better off. For educational attainment and unemployment, a positive number indicates 
whites are better off. These metrics are useful because they show the extent to which 
African Americans occupy a marginalized position within their given communities 
compared to the dominant white group. The inequality ratios do not show the level of 
educational attainment, unemployment, and income for all populations within an entire 
city or county. Instead, it measures the relative disadvantage of African Americans 
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specifically. These ratios will allow us to see whether there is an interaction between 
racial inequality and the criminalization of African Americans.  
d. Analysis 
 This study examines whether hate crime enforcement, which purports to promote 
racial equality, works to the detriment of racial minorities by leading to their 
disproportionate criminalization. It does so by asking who bears the burden of hate 
criminalization by police and whether disparities exist. This analysis therefore explores 
the relationship between race and the enforcement of hate crime laws. It predicts that 
police will recognize whites as more likely to commit hate-motivated offenses, but their 
enforcement will nonetheless succumb to systemic bias throughout the criminal justice 
system, resulting in disparate enforcement against African Americans of the variety 
known to other criminal contexts. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Offender race is a significant predictor of whether police label a crime as 
bias-motivated, with the odds of white offenders receiving such a designation 
significantly greater than that of African American offenders. Offenses involving 
a white offender will be most likely to be recognized as a hate crime.  
 
H2: African Americans are overrepresented in arrests among hate crime offenders 
to a similar degree as they are overrepresented in arrests among non-hate 
offenders; i.e., we see similar disparities in arrest rates between African 
Americans and whites across hate and non-hate crimes, with no significant 
difference between the two contexts. 
 
H3: Communities with more extreme racial inequality have greater disparities in 
enforcement.  
 
 Answering these questions requires measurement of key variables on multiple 
levels: it involves the regression of police actions (bias motive designation and incidence 
of arrest) on suspect racial identifiers. The model must also control for other factors that 
may explain variation, like seriousness of offense, as well as community-level 
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characteristics, including crime rates for comparable non-hate crimes, the racial 
composition of the geographic area, and level of racial inequality. Other relevant 
variables are excluded from the study due to limitations in how the UCR currently 
compiles Hate Crime Data (see section IV below).  
 If the coefficient for African Americans is a significant negative predictor of 
whether police ascribe bias to a crime, it will show police recognize white criminality as 
more frequently hate-driven. If racial disparities in hate crime enforcement mirror those 
in the criminal justice system, it will signify that it suffers from similar systemic bias. A 
finding that racial inequality predicts disproportionate enforcement against African 
Americans will indicate hate criminalization is an extension of the racial subordination 
occurring in communities in which they are most marginalized. If no significant 
relationship exists between race and police action, it will suggest anti-hate regulations 
successfully avoided the racial disparities endemic to the criminal justice system.  
 This study employs several statistical tests. To test H1, Bernouli logistic models 
measure the relative odds of an incident receiving a bias designation based the offenders’ 
race or ethnicity (odds ratios). Put another way, these models take into account all 
assaults, and calculate the odds police will label one a hate crime if the offender is white, 
African American, or of another racial or ethnic group. This will reveal whether offender 
race or ethnicity is a significant predictor of police recording a crime as bias-motivated.  
 The analysis then uses a combination of Bernouli logistic and negative binomial 
regression models to test H2. First, a Bernouli logistic model measures the relative odds 
of an incident involving an African American suspect based on whether it was bias-
motivated. It controls for offense type and the relative population of each demographic 
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group. This shows whether African American arrest rates significantly differ between the 
hate and non-hate contexts.  
 Then, to facilitate a closer examination of the relative arrest rates in both contexts, 
the analysis uses negative binomial regression models to test H2. The first of these 
models measures incidence rates ratios of arrests among hate crimes, and the second 
repeats the test for non-hate crimes. This statistic considers the counts of arrests for each 
racial group, and calculates their arrest rates based on their relative populations while also 
controlling for overall population. This determines the extent to which groups are 
overrepresented based on their population size, notably showing the degree to which 
African Americans comprise a disproportionately large segment of alleged offenders.  
 Due to overdispersion, the negative binomial regression model provides the best 
fit. Overdispersion occurs when more variability exists around the model’s fitted values 
than possible for a Poisson formulation (Berk and MacDonald 2008). Negative binomial 
regression tests require the exposure (i.e., population of a given racial group) to be 
greater than zero and known. Thus, the models omit observations not meeting the 
exposure criteria, dropping: (1) those for which the population is zero; and (2) those for 
which population is unknown, i.e., incidents with multiple offenders comprised of more 
than one racial or ethnic category whose population cannot be determined.  
 The Bernouli and negative binomial models mentioned will also provide 
opportunities to test H3, revealing whether significant interactions exist between offender 
race and community-level racial inequality. In other words, they will measure whether 
communities with greater racial inequality treat African Americans more harshly in their 
hate crime enforcement.   
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 The first series Bernouli models has three iterations: Model 1A is a null model 
without fixed effects; Model 1B adds level-1 fixed effects (race and severity of offense); 
and Model 1C adds the level-2 fixed effect (inequality metrics for income, education, and 
unemployment). This allows for a comparison for level-2 variance.  
The mathematical formula for the final Bernouli model is as follows: !"#$%&'$'()*+ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) =  !" 	+	!%-'()*+,-.)		 + !"-$(&''()*(+,	)		 +	"#(%&'()*	+,-%(.)		 
+ 	"#$(&'()*+,-.	/*+,-0)		 + 	"##(%&'()*&%+,	-.,/)0)		 + !"#$"%('()*+,)(./)01*	'(3.0,)		 + !"#$%"('()*+,)(*./)(0123	'(012,)		 + !""#"$(&'()*+)()-./01-)23+)		 + !"#			 
Level 2: !"#			~ N [0, !"		u0] 
Level 1: Var(!"#$%&'$'()*+|	.*+ 	) 	= .*+	(1	 −	.*+)		 
  
 The next Bernouli model segment has one iteration: Model 2 measures the 
relative odds of an incident involving an African American suspect based on whether it 
was bias-motivated. It is a single level analysis. The mathematical formula is as follows: !""#$%#&	(()* 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%('()*+,-*-./01)		 + !"-$(&''()*(+,	)		 + !"($ℎ&'(	*+*,-.'&+/0	)		 + !"($$	&'&()*+,'-.	)		 + !"($%&'()*'*+,-.)(00	(2(34&,%2+.)		 + !"#			 
Level 1: Var(!""#$%#&	(()*|	,)* 	) 	= ,)*	(1	 −	,)*)		 
 
 The negative binomial regression has two iterations: Model 3A, which measures 
hate-related incidents with level-1 and level-2 fixed effects; and Model 3B, which 
measures non-hate-related incidents with level-1 and level-2 fixed effects.  This model is 
similar to a Poisson, with the exception of the level 1 variance, which is a function of the 
mean and scale parameter, notated as follows:  
 Model 3A Level 1: Var(ℎ"#$	&'(&)$'#*+,|	.+, 	, 0)	  = 	"#$ + "#$& '  
Model 3B Level 1: Var(!"! − ℎ%&'	)!*)+'!&,-.|	0-. 	, 2)	  = 	"#$ + "#$& '  
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III. Results 
To test H1, bias designations were regressed on available variables for offender 
race or ethnicity (white, African American, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian) and 
severity of offense (intimidation, simple assault, aggravated assault) using all indicator 
codes. The models are multilevel, with level-1 representing incident-level variables, and 
level-2 representing city/county-level variables. Model 1A is a null model without fixed 
effects. Model 1B adds level-1 fixed effects (race and severity of offense). Model 1C 
adds level-2 fixed effects (income, education, and unemployment disparities).  
The substantive conclusions were consistent across Models 1B and 1C (Table 2-
4). The coefficient for African American was a significant negative predictor in these 
models, whereas the coefficients for American Indian and multiracial offender groups 
(i.e., those with multiple assailants of different identities) were significant positive 
predictors (see Model 1C, Table 2-4). The coefficient for Asian/Pacific Islander offenders 
was not statistically significant. In the median city/county, incidents involving African 
American offenders had .81 the odds of receiving a hate designation than those involving 
white offenders. Incidents with American Indian offenders had 1.49 the odds of receiving 
a hate designation than those with white offenders. Multiracial groups had 3.5 times the 
odds of receiving a hate designation than white offenders. The coefficients for severity of 
offense were significant negative predictors of whether an officer labeled a crime as hate-
motivated, with simple and aggravated assault having far smaller odds than intimidation 
in the median city/county (see Model 1C).   
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Table 2-4: Bernouli Logistic Regressions of 
Bias Designation on Race and Inequality 
 
Model 1: 
Null 
Model 2:  
Level-1 Fixed Effects 
Model 3: 
Level-2 Fixed Effects 
 OR OR P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval OR P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Race 
           White (ref.)            African Am - 0.73 0.00 *** 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.00 *** 0.76 0.87 
Asian/PI - 1.01 0.89 
 
0.87 1.17 0.89 0.45 
 
0.67 1.19 
AI - 1.22 0.01 ** 1.06 1.40 1.49 0.00 ** 1.24 1.78 
Multi - 2.99 0.00 *** 2.80 3.20 3.50 0.00 *** 3.14 3.91 
            Income - - 
  
- 
 
1.08 0.04 * 1.00 1.17 
Unemp. - - 
  
- 
 
0.98 0.01 * 0.97 1.00 
Educ. - -   -  1.04 0.71  0.84 1.29 
            
Income*Race - -   -       
African Am. - -   -  0.99 0.89  0.82 1.19 
Asian/PI - -   -  0.55 0.12  0.25 1.16 
AI - -   -  1.49 0.01 ** 1.11 2.00 
Multi - -   -  1.08 0.57  0.83 1.39 
            
Unemp.*Race - -   -       
African Am. - -   -  0.53 0.00 *** 0.43 0.64 
Asian/PI - -   -  0.62 0.12  0.34 1.13 
AI - -   -  0.77 0.31  0.46 1.39 
Multi - -   -  0.48 0.00 *** 0.36 0.36 
            
Offense            Intimidation (ref)           Simple - 0.29 0.00 *** 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.00 *** 0.28 0.30 
Aggravated - 0.59 0.00 *** 0.57 0.61 0.58 0.00 *** 0.56 0.61 
            Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 
            City/County 
          Variance 3.85 3.75 
  
3.48 4.05 3.95 
  
3.66 4.28 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. OR means odds ratio. Asian/PI refers to Asian and Pacific Islander. AI denotes 
American Indian. Multi means the offender group was comprised of multiple individual, 
and they have different racial or ethnic identities.  
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Testing of H2 involved two steps. In step one, offender race (African American or 
not) was regressed on the variable for whether the crime was hate-motivated and offense 
type. The coefficient indicating the crime involved hate is a significant negative predictor 
of whether the suspect was African American (Model 2, Table 2-5). An arrest involving a 
hate-motivated offense has two-thirds the odds of a non-hate offense of involving an 
African American offender, and a hate crime is significantly less likely to involve an 
African American suspect, even when controlling for the population of African 
Americans. Put another way, hate crimes are significantly less likely than non-hate 
crimes to involve African Americans, even as African American population increases.  
In step two, the number of times police cited/summoned/arrested people for hate-
related assaults was regressed on the variables for race and ethnicity and the coefficients 
for racial inequality in terms of income, educational attainment, and unemployment. 
(Model 3A, Table 2-6). This was offset by the population of each racial and ethnic group 
in a given geographic area (exposure), controlling for overall population, as well.  
The coefficients for African American and American Indian offenders were 
significant positive predictors of incidence rates, and the coefficient for Asian/Pacific 
Islander offenders was a significant negative predictor (Model 3A, Table 2-6). The 
expected number of hate-related assault citations/summons/arrests was 2.85 times higher 
for African Americans than whites, and 1.34 times higher for American Indians than 
whites. Asian/Pacific Islander offenders were cited/summoned/arrested for hate-related 
assaults at less than one-fifth the rate of whites.  
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Table 2-5: Bernouli Logistic Regression of African American 
Suspect on Hate and Non-Hate Offenses and Group Populations 
 
Model 2  
 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
      Hate Crime 
     Non-Hate (ref) 
     Hate 0.676125 0.00 *** 0.62 0.74 
      Population 
     White 0.999998 0.00 ** 1.00 1.00 
African Am. 1.000008 0.00 *** 1.00 1.00 
      Hate*African Am. 
Population 
     Non-Hate (ref) 
     Hate 0.999997 0.00 *** 1.00 1.00 
      Offense 
     Intimidation (ref) 
     Simple 1.349706 0.00 *** 1.27 1.43 
Aggravated 1.502125 0.00 *** 1.38 1.63 
      Intercept 0.289414 0.00 *** 0.26 0.33 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. OR means odds ratio. 
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Table 2-6: Negative Binomial Regressions  
of Arrests on Race and Inequality for Hate and Non-Hate Offenses 
 
Model 3A: Hate Model 3B: Non-Hate 
 
IRR P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval IRR P>Z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Race 
          White (ref) 
          African Am. 2.85 0.00 *** 2.58 3.16 3.09 0.00 *** 3.01 3.18 
Asian/PI 0.19 0.00 *** 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.00 *** 0.27 0.29 
AI 1.34 0.01 
 
1.08 1.65 0.54 0.00 *** 0.52 0.55 
           Income 0.89 0.05 * 0.79 1.00 0.98 0.71 
 
0.87 1.11 
Unemp. 0.99 0.13  0.97 1.00 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 1.00 
Educ. 0.72 0.01 * 0.56 0.92 0.98 0.78  0.87 1.11 
           
Race*Income           
White (ref.)           
African Am. 1.60 0.00 *** 1.27 2.00 0.92 0.00 ** 0.88 0.97 
Asian/PI 0.37 0.03 * 0.15 0.89 0.90 0.02  0.84 0.96 
AI 1.20 0.37  0.80 1.80 0.87 0.00 *** 0.82 0.92 
           
Race*Unemp. 
          White (ref.) 
          African Am. 1.02 0.41 
 
0.98 1.06 1.01 0.00 *** 1.00 1.01 
Asian/PI 1.03 0.46 
 
0.95 1.12 1.00 0.87 
 
1.00 1.01 
AI 1.04 0.07 
 
1.00 1.08 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 1.01 
          
Race*Educ.           
White (ref.)           
African Am. 0.63 0.01 *** 0.44 0.90 0.81 0.00 *** 0.73 0.90 
Asian/PI 0.96 0.91  0.44 2.07 1.00 0.97  0.86 1.15 
AI 1.12 0.72  0.59 2.15 1.15 0.08  0.98 1.34 
           Intercept 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 *** 0.03 0.03 
Exposure 1 
    
1 
    Total Pop. 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 1.00 
           City/County 
          Variance 1.22 
  
1.12 1.33 3.16 
  
3.04 3.29 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. IRR means incidence rates ratio.  
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To see whether these results were unique to hate-related offenses, the same model 
was run on non-hate incidents (Model 3B, Table 2-6). The number of times police 
cited/summoned/arrested someone for non-hate assaults was regressed on the variables 
for race and ethnicity and the level of inequality, offset by sub-group populations 
(exposure). The coefficient for African American offenders was a significant positive 
predictor of incidence rates, whereas the coefficients for American Indian and 
Asian/Pacific Islander offenders were significant negative predictors. The expected 
number of non-hate citations/summons/arrests for non-hate assaults was three times 
higher for African Americans than whites. Asians/Pacific Islanders and American Indians 
were cited/summoned/arrested a little more than one-quarter and one-half the rate of 
whites respectively.  
To test H3, bias designations were regressed on available variables for offender 
race or ethnicity (white, African American, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian) and 
severity of offense (intimidation, simple assault, aggravated assault), as well as the 
metrics for racial inequality. The coefficient signifying the disparities in income had a 
significant positive effect on hate designations, whereas the coefficient representing 
disparities in employment had a significant negative effect (Model 1C, table 2-4). 
Disparities in educational attainment were not significant. The interaction between 
income disparities and whether the offender was American Indian had a significant 
positive effect. The interaction between whether the disparities in unemployment and 
whether the offender was African American had a significant negative effect.  
Disparities in income and educational attainment had significant negative effects 
on incidents rates of arrests for hate crimes, but not for non-hate crimes (Model 3A, 
  
 
40 
Table 2-6). For non-hate arrests, the coefficient for inequality in unemployment had a 
significant negative effect (Model 3B, Table 2-6). However, when considering the 
interaction between these inequality metrics and the race of the offender, the patterns 
change. The interaction between the coefficients for African American suspects and 
income equality has a significant positive effect on incidence rates of arrests for hate 
crimes, but a significant negative effect for non-hate crimes. The interaction between the 
coefficients for the interaction between African American suspects and educational 
inequality had a significant negative effect on incidence rates of arrests for hate crimes 
and non-hate crimes.  The interaction between the coefficients for African American 
suspects and disparities in unemployment had a significant positive effect on incidence 
rates ratios for arrests in non-hate crimes, but no significant effect for hate crimes. 
However, the interaction between inequality and race was significant for African 
American and American Indian offenders, with higher rates of inequality translating into 
smaller disparities between these groups and the reference group, whites (Model 3B, 
Table 2-6). Relatedly, there was significant between-city/county variation in both Models 
3A and 3B. However, the number more than doubled between the former and the latter, 
with level-2 variance at 1.22 for hate incidents and 3.16 for non-hate incidents.  
IV. Discussion 
a. Evidence of Racial Disparities 
This study set out to explore whether anti-hate regulations contribute to the mass 
criminalization of African Americans, looking at police-level decisions regarding who 
has committed a hate crime. It examines whether suspect race predicts police labeling 
incidents as hate-driven, the extent to which racial or ethnic groups are overrepresented 
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among hate crime offenders, and whether these disparities resemble those seen in the 
non-hate context. If hate crime enforcement is plagued with the same racial bias 
characteristic of the criminal justice system, we should see that, even when police 
recognize whites as the majority of hate crime perpetrators, African American offenders 
still represent a disproportionate share of those arrested for hate crimes, and those 
disparate arrests rates do not differ significantly from those for non-hate offenses. 
The results provide equivocal support for that theory. Consistent with H1, offender 
race is a significant predictor of whether police label a crime as bias-motivated. The odds 
of an African American offender receiving such a designation is significantly less than 
that of a white offender. Put another way, assaults have significantly higher odds of being 
labeled a hate crime when committed by white rather than African American suspects. 
This held true when controlling for geographic location as well as the type and severity of 
offense. Standing alone, this outcome seems consistent with conventional wisdom that 
anti-hate laws address aggression from the dominant group in society (i.e., white 
aggressors), and it appears to counteract concerns that colorblind anti-hate laws, in 
combination with systemic racial bias and discrimination, lead to disparate enforcement 
against African Americans. However, the subsequent statistical tests provide evidence to 
the contrary.      
As predicted in H2, the results reveal disparities. When taking into account relative 
populations, African American suspects are significantly overrepresented among hate-
related assault suspects. African Americans are the targets of police action for these 
crimes at significantly higher rates than whites. However, these disparities are still 
significantly lower than those in the non-hate context.  The expected number of 
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citations/summons/arrests for non-hate assaults was 3.09 times higher for African 
Americans than whites. The numbers for hate crime assaults are less extreme, but bear a 
close resemblance, with the expected number of citations/summons/arrests for hate-
related assaults still 2.85 times higher for African Americans than whites. Despite their 
similarities, the arrest rates for non-hate and hate offenses differ significantly (Model 2, 
Table 2-5). This outcome suggests that biases within the criminal justice system do 
permeate hate crime enforcement, despite good intentions, but to a significantly lesser 
degree. Racial disparities are present, though attenuated, for hate crimes.  Nonetheless, 
these findings resonate with early research warning African Americans would comprise 
an unequal contingent of hate crime offenders (for a discussion of this research, see 
Franklin 2002). Thus, even though the hate crimes police are learning about and 
responding to involve whites as perpetrators, there is reason to believe structural forces 
perpetuating bias and discrimination are still at play.  
All of the models suggest American Indians are significantly burdened by hate crime 
enforcement. An assault involving an American Indians suspect is approximately 1.49 
times more like to be designated a hate crime than one involving a white suspect (Model 
1C, Table 2-4). Similarly, American Indians are 1.34 times as likely to be 
cited/summoned/arrested for a hate-related assault as whites (Model 3A, Table 2-6). This 
is in stark contrast to non-hate assaults, in which they are only half as likely as whites to 
be involved (Model 3B, Table 2-6). American Indians are disproportionately subject to 
hate crime enforcement.  
Asian and Pacific Islanders are only about a quarter as likely as whites to be involved 
in either hate or non-hate assaults, and when they are involved, the odds of police 
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labeling their conduct hate-motivated does not differ significantly from the odds for 
whites.  
Interestingly, groups comprised of offenders from multiple racial/ethnic categories 
had about 3 times the odds of receiving a hate designation than white offenders. A post-
hoc Bernouli analysis was conducted adding the number of offenders as a control to 
determine whether this significance was attributable to the size or the racial character of 
the group. Notably, while offender group size was also a significant positive predictor of 
whether a crime received the hate designation, the racial composition maintained its 
significance with the addition of this control. This suggests that something about the 
racialized nature of the offender group affects how the officers interpret its conduct. 
These findings support claims that groups of racial minorities are often characterized and 
perceived as threatening. For example, critics have noted the media portrays non-whites 
as “rioting” when engaged in protest, or “looting” when responding to natural disasters, 
while depicting comparable white actions in a more empathetic and favorable light (see, 
e.g., Jones 2005; Finley 2015). The public sees non-white and multiracial groups as more 
disorderly and dangerous. This tendency seems to carry over to the hate crime context.  
The results show some support for H3, depending on the inequality metric.  Hate 
crime enforcement is greater in communities with African Americans who have higher 
earnings than their white counterparts (Model 1C, Table 2-4). While income inequality 
leads to lower incidence rates of hate crimes overall, it has a significant positive effect 
when interacted with African American offenders (Model 3A, Table 2-6). In other words, 
the better off African Americans are relative to their white counterparts, the more likely it 
is they will be arrested for hate crimes. Interestingly, the trend is the opposite for non-
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hate crimes, where greater disparities representing higher African American incomes 
translate into lower arrest rates of African Americans overall. However, these findings 
change when focusing on educational attainment. Inequality in educational attainment 
has a significant negative effect on African American arrest rates in both the hate and 
non-hate contexts. The greater the difference between whites and African Americans in 
education, the lower the disparities in arrests. No discernible pattern exists for 
unemployment inequality. Thus, disparities in income positively predict African 
American arrest rates for hate crimes, but disparities in education and employment do not 
show the same pattern.  
b. Limitations and Future Opportunities 
This study faced significant methodological limitations. Most notably, it excludes all 
jurisdictions that report crime statistics via programs outside NIBRS. As a result, the 
sample omits at least two-thirds of UCR reporting agencies for any given year. This 
means entire states are missing. Quite possibly, missing states (notably New York, 
Florida, and California), which have large and diverse populations, may have very 
different patterns in hate crime enforcement. Further, because agencies may differ within 
a state regarding their mode of reporting, those states represented in the sample may be 
missing key jurisdictions. NIBRS is not a representative sample of crime in the United 
States, and this greatly affects the generalizability of the models.  
Further, valuable information was lost in an effort to harmonize NIBRS and Hate 
Crime Data. NIBRS collects important incident-level data that was omitted to be 
consistent with the Hate Crime Data, like information on the crime (e.g., whether it was 
attempted or completed and the severity of the injury), how police handled it (e.g., 
  
 
45 
citation, summons, arrest), and victim characteristics (e.g., race, sex, and age). NIBRS 
also provided an offender-level breakdown of racial characteristics, which was diluted to 
match the Hate Crime Data offender group aggregates. Until the FBI achieves its goal of 
having all agencies report via NIBRS, it will be difficult to systematically measure these 
important incident- and offender-level differences. As a result, this study may have 
overlooked significant variables.  
Like other hate crime research, this study is limited in its ability to accurately 
measure crime rates.  First, it is greatly hindered by discrepancies in enforcement and 
reporting. Much variation exists in how departments approach the issue, including in 
policies, procedures, training, and resource allocation (Franklin 2002; Bell 2002; Jenness 
and Grattet 2001). Importantly, most agencies report no hate crime at all; the hate crime 
data in this study come from a fraction of agencies nationwide. For example, 88.4 percent 
of agencies participating in the Hate Crime Data Program reported no hate crimes 
occurred in the jurisdictions in 2016 (Hate Crime Data, 2016).  
Second, hate crimes are underreported, particularly among racial minorities. Indeed, 
Zaykowski (2010) used data from the National Crime Victimization Survey to explore 
the influence of the victim’s race on reporting hate crimes to the police. Controlling for 
other demographic and incident characteristics, her results revealed that minority 
victimizations are less likely to be reported for hate crimes, and the magnitude of this 
effect is even greater for those motivated by race specifically. Racial minority 
victimizations were approximately 35 percent less likely to be reported than white 
victimizations. Other researchers have found an incident with a white victim significantly 
increases the probability of police involvement, possibly due to the willingness of certain 
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groups to contact the police for assistance. (Wilson and Ruback 2003). This issue of 
underreporting means official statistics may understate the hate crime, particularly for 
those involving non-white victims. This could also mean the number of white offenders is 
underreported. This likely skews the distribution of victims and attendant offenders  in 
the sample.  
Another noteworthy issue with this study is its lack of pertinent ethnic information. 
The UCR began compiling data on Hispanic origin in 2012. However, even in subsequent 
years, many agencies lacked that level of detail. Thus, while the criminal justice system 
disproportionately punishes Hispanics, this study fails to examine whether hate crime 
enforcement contributes to the problem. Further, the data lack nuance and may provide a 
simplistic and inflated picture of whites in the sample. According to the 2010, 53 percent 
of Hispanics identified as white, as opposed to 2.5, 1.4, 0.5, and 0.1 percent who 
identified as African American, American Indian, Asian/Pacific Islander respectively 
(Humes, Jones, and Ramizerz 2011). Thus, lacking a Hispanic option likely has a greater 
effect on white than African American suspects in the sample. This study suggests the 
odds of police labeling an assault as a hate crime are significantly higher for whites than 
African Americans. However, distinguishing between Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites 
may alter that statistic and erode its significance. Data on Hispanic origin is needed to 
provide an accurate measure of how hate crime enforcement impacts both white and non-
white Hispanic communities.  
Thus, looking forward, researchers should refine the method for measuring how 
police enforce hate crime laws and the effects of this enforcement on various racial and 
ethnic communities.  More detailed and reliable information will be available as the 
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number of agencies reporting to NIBRS increases. Researchers may consider other 
sources of hate crime data too, including victimization surveys, as well as reports 
generated in response to public records requests or for government agencies engaged in 
police oversight or human rights work. These analyses should also try to capture data on 
incidents that do not result in arrest or other formal police action.  
Future research should also examine hate crime enforcement at other stages in the 
criminal justice system. Many decision-making points exist throughout the process 
wherein broad discretion and racial and ethnic bias invite disparities. Prosecutors, judges, 
juries, and parole boards play significant roles in determining who is punished and to 
what extent. Research scrutinizing decisions around charging, plea bargaining, pretrial 
release, conviction, sentencing, and parole may illuminate significant disparities. This 
empirical work is necessary to truly appreciate the impacts of criminalization.  
Finally, scholars should study the effects of hate crime laws more broadly. 
Conventional wisdom suggests strict regulation will communicate zero tolerance for 
bigotry and violence. However, limited research exists on whether hate crime statutes 
actually have a deterrent effect. In fact, some research indicates otherwise: prosecution 
may increase resentment towards minorities because it plays into the offenders’ 
perceptions that they were the victims of oppression by a more socially privileged and 
powerful group (Franklin 2002). Moreover, in other criminal justice contexts, social 
science has shown therapeutic approaches to have superior outcomes to punitive ones 
(see, e.g., Warren 2009). Therefore, more work is needed to evaluate the efficacy of hate 
crime laws in combating hate and promoting racial equality.  
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V. Conclusion 
While it is true that racial inequality is a significant problem in contemporary U.S. 
society, it is also undeniable that the criminal justice system has been a major culprit in 
creating and perpetuating that inequality. Accordingly, an honest assessment of the 
efficacy of hate crime laws must include an analysis of its effects on those it punishes. 
This study set out to begin that analysis into whether hate crime laws have the unintended 
consequence of promoting racial inequality by contributing to the mass criminalization of 
African Americans. It did so by looking at police-level decisions regarding who has 
committed a hate crime, examining whether any racial ethnic groups are overrepresented 
among hate crime offenders, and the extent to which disparities in hate crime 
enforcement resemble those throughout the criminal justice system. These preliminary 
findings suggest there is cause for concern. Police are less likely to designate an assault a 
hate crime for African American suspects than white, but African Americans are 
nonetheless significantly overrepresented among hate crime offenders, though these 
disparities are significantly lower than those seen in non-hate contexts. Likewise, major 
disparities exist among American Indians. The effects on Hispanics remain unknown. 
These results indicate hate crime enforcement may indeed be a double-edged sword that 
cuts against those it aims to protect. Further research is needed to fully understand how 
police – as well as other criminal justice officials – enforce hate crime laws, and the 
reverberations of this enforcement on society.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE QUINTESSENTIAL HATE CRIME? 
VICTIM BIAS AD RACIAL DISPARITIES IN HATE CRIME ENFORCEMENT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores whether offender race/ethnicity predicts how victims and police 
interpret and respond to crime. Are they more or less likely to label an incident a hate 
crime or to react punitively by reporting the incident or executing an arrest based on the 
perpetrator’s demographic characteristics? As Chapter 1 discussed, the decision on 
whether to categorize an incident as a hate crime involves a high level of subjectivity. 
Victims, police officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries look at the circumstances and 
infer whether the bias motive exists. Thus, several researchers have explored how race 
influences the perception of hate crime, and the findings present an interesting 
contradiction. On the one hand, people tend to have a preconceived notion of the 
quintessential hate crime in which African Americans are victims. On the other hand, the 
public and criminal justice system tend to have a preconceived notion of the prototypical 
criminal, in which African Americans are seen as offenders. This begs the question: 
which preconception predominates in the context of real-world hate crime incidents, that 
which sympathizes with African Americans as victims, or that which villainizes them 
offenders? While we cannot directly measure the thoughts of those involved in a crime, 
we can examine whether, in the aggregate, race predicts how victims interpret their 
offenses or how victims and police respond. If similarly situated offenders are treated 
more punitively – by being labeled a hate criminal, being reported to police, and being 
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arrested – based on race, it will strongly indicate a negative bias towards African 
Americans occurs in anti-hate enforcement.   
A notable body of social psychological research suggests that individuals are 
particularly sympathetic towards African Americans in the hate crime context. People are 
more likely to interpret a crime as bias-motivated when committed by a white perpetrator 
against an African American victim. Lyons (2006) examined the influence of social 
status on the assignment of blame in hate crime scenarios, using a quasi-experimental 
factorial vignette design. He found the status of the victim and offender influenced 
attributions of blame, with respondents showing sensitivity to racial status asymmetry. 
Specifically, respondents blamed white offenders more than African American offenders. 
Further, they blamed offenders more for victimizing African Americans than whites and 
assigned less blame to African American victims than white. Similarly, in three 
experiments with mock jurors, Marcus-Newhall, Blake, and Baumann (2002) evaluated 
the influence of race on perceptions of hate crime perpetrators and victims. They found 
mock jurors had a greater certainty of guilt and gave longer sentences when the victim 
was African American than white. They also found the perpetrator’s race had a 
marginally significant effect: mock jurors were more certain of guilt when the perpetrator 
was white than African American. Participants perceived hate crimes committed by white 
perpetrators against African American victims most negatively. Saucier et al. (2008) also 
found that mock jurors generally assigned greater blame and recommended longer 
sentences to white perpetrators of violence against African American victims than to 
African American perpetrators against white victims. 
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These sympathetic perceptions of hate crime are even more accentuated among racial 
minorities. Craig and Waldo (1996) conducted surveys on college students to understand 
how they conceptualize hate crimes. Respondents of color were twice as likely as their 
white counterparts to associate hate crime victimization with minority group status. 
Similarly, while 19 percent of all respondents indicated the typical hate crime perpetrator 
was white, 4 percent of white respondents and 46 percent of African American 
respondents expressed this view. In another study, researchers found that minority 
participants evaluated incidents as more severe when the victim was African American 
than white, but that effect did not occur for white participants (Marcus-Newhall, Blake, 
and Baumann 2002). However, white participants would give longer sentences for 
defendants when the victim was African American if their white peers encouraged them 
to do so.  
At the same time, research also reveals people associate African Americans with 
criminality. African Americans are seen as more suspicious, and people tend to 
overestimate their culpability (Pickett et al. 2012; Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004; 
Carbado 2016; see also Carbado and Roithmayr 2014; Goff 2014). Further, people see 
African Americans as more threatening and dangerous, evoking more severe reactions, 
including support for punitive policies and the use of lethal force (Barkan and Cohn 
2005; Unnever and Cullen 2012; King and Wheelock 2007; Eberhardt et al. 2004; Sim et 
al. 2013; Correll et al. 2002). These racial biases distort our legal institutions, as well, 
with officials throughout the system treating African Americans more harshly, 
irrespective of their conduct or history (see, e.g., Fagen et al. 2009; Kutateladze, et al. 
2014; Berdijo 2018; Mitchell and MacKenzie 2004; Huebner and Bynam 2008).  
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Some evidence indicates these trends carry over to hate crime contexts. Studies show 
a relationship between racist and pro-punishment ideology and an anti-African American 
perception and response to crime scenarios potentially involving hate. In a study using 
responses from a national telephone survey of 1,300 American adults, Steen and Cohen 
(2004) explored factors that affect public support for enhanced punishment for hate 
crimes. Respondents who believed that minorities have too few rights requested more 
lenient sentences for non-hate crimes, but not for hate crimes. The authors speculate that 
individuals who are concerned with minority rights may be more aware than others of the 
overrepresentation of minorities in prison and wish to mitigate that problem. However, 
respondents with pro-punishment attitudes were less likely to request imprisonment when 
asked about hate crimes. In fact, they requested more lenient punishments for hate crime 
offenders than for the average offender. Saucier et al. (2008) found a high level of 
participant racism was associated with less severe sentencing for crimes by whites against 
African Americans and more severe sentencing for crimes by African Americans against 
whites. Similarly, in subsequent research, Saucier et al. (2010) found higher levels of 
racism resulted in longer sentences for African American assailants, but not white. The 
authors hypothesized this relationship may have emerged because the racist participants 
may see African American violence as a confirmation of their negative stereotypes about 
African American people.  In addition, participants with more racist views blame victims 
more and perpetrators less when the perpetrators are white, though no such relationship 
exists for African American perpetrators. The researchers also found a relationship – 
though not one of significance – between participant racism and whether they categorize 
a crime as a hate crime: individuals with higher levels of racism were more likely to 
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associate hate crime commission with African American perpetrators. A marginally 
significant relationship existed between racism scores and the belief that hate crimes 
should be punished more severely, with lower racism levels predicting a greater support.   
Thus, social psychological research reveals two competing biases at play: one 
oriented towards civil rights, another oriented towards negative racial biases. On the one 
hand, studies repeatedly show people attribute bias to crimes involving white perpetrators 
and African American victims. Indeed, hate crime legislation grew from an effort by civil 
rights and social justice advocates to raise awareness about bigotry directed at minority 
groups and respond to violence stemming from it (Jenness and Grattet 2001). Consistent 
with this vision, the public appears to recognize hate crimes as phenomena in which the 
dominant group victimizes historically vulnerable and marginalized factions of society. 
This is what many consider the quintessential hate crime. I refer to this as a civil rights 
orientation to hate crime.  
On the other hand, racial animus may distort this typical understanding of hate crime 
dynamics. Studies show negative racial stereotypes are strong in the criminal justice 
context, individuals with racist views are more likely to attribute bias to crimes involving 
African American perpetrators than white, and to advocate for harsher treatment of the 
former. These findings reflect broader patterns of public opinion and criminal justice in 
the United States, wherein crime is racialized and race is criminalized; criminality is 
associated with African Americans, and African Americans are associated with 
criminality (Carbado and Roithmayr 2014; Alexander 2012).  African Americans are seen 
as more culpable (see, e.g., Goff et al. 2014). The desire to crack down on African 
American offenders is likely an extension of historical ‘get tough’ approaches to crime, 
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as discussed in Chapter 1, which strive to tame, control, and subordinate African 
Americans, who are seen as a threat (see, e.g., Alexander 2012). For many, African 
Americans are the prototypical criminal.  I refer to this as the racial bias orientation to 
hate crime.  
Meanwhile, research also shows the effect of bias may be situational. Individuals are 
more susceptible to their implicit biases in certain contexts. Significantly, we rely more 
heavily on our attitudes and stereotypes under stressful circumstances. Fear, time 
pressure, fatigue, and ambiguity can exacerbate bias and shape a person’s interpretation 
of an incident and their subsequent decision-making (see, e.g., Smolkowsi et al. 2016; 
Payne 2005; Correll et al. 2007; Girvan 2016; Girvan and Marek 2016; Danziger, Levav, 
and Avnaim-Pesso 2011). These studies suggest individuals revert to negative stereotypes 
under duress. This is particularly important since victims and police are dealing with 
stressful events when determining whether a hate crime occurred and how to respond.   
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, scholarly work on race and public perception 
of hate crime is contradictory and inconclusive. Moreover, significant gaps exist. Most 
notably, research is very limited regarding how biases operate in the real-world context. 
Most studies involve experimental designs with hypothetical vignettes, but do not capture 
how people actually perceive incidents in their daily lives. This chapter builds upon the 
existing body of knowledge by exploring whether race predicts how crime victims 
perceive their victimization, and the degree to which it contributes to racial disparities in 
hate crime enforcement. It theorizes the racial bias orientation to hate crime prevails in 
real-world hate crime scenarios: victims will most likely identify an incident as a hate 
crime, as well as respond punitively by reporting the crime to police, when the 
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perpetrator is African American; and police will treat African Americans more punitively 
than whites by arresting them at significantly higher rates. These hypotheses are 
consistent with the research above suggesting that: (1) a widely-held and deeply-
engrained stereotype of African Americans exists conflating them with criminality; (2) 
the criminal justice system is highly racialized, with African Americans 
disproportionately criminalized and punished; (3) racial animus has been shown to distort 
the typical understanding of hate crime dynamics; and (4) negative racial biases are 
especially acute in stressful situations, such as crime scenes. 
Using statistical tests, and controlling for victim race/ethnicity and type and severity 
of offense, I model whether suspect race/ethnicity predicts when a victim will identify an 
incident as hate-driven, as well as their decision to report it to police. I also measure the 
extent to which racial and ethnic groups are overrepresented among hate crime arrestees, 
and whether police are significantly more likely to act punitively towards an African 
American by arresting them when the victim labels the incident as hate motivated. This 
analysis whittles away at the broader question of whether a society with deeply engrained 
biases regarding race and crime, as well as pervasive systemic racism, can rely on its 
criminal justice system to promote racial equality, as is the goal of anti-hate legislation. 
II. Methods 
a. Data Sources 
 
This study employs data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 
and the U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census. The NCVS provides data on the 
frequency, characteristics, and consequences of crime victimization, including 
race/ethnicity information on the offender and victim and whether the victim perceived 
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the crime to have a bias motive. The Decennial Census has demographic information that 
enables the calculation of arrest rates for the different racial or ethnic groups.  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics within the U.S. Department of Justice administers 
the NCVS. This study uses the “National Crime Victimization Survey, Concatenated File, 
1992-2015,” available via the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, and the following description of the NCVS comes from the codebook for that 
data set (U.S. Department of Justice 2016).  
The NCVS began in 1973 (under the name National Crime Surveys), and hate 
crime data collection started in 2003. The NCVS involves an ongoing survey of a 
nationally-representative sample of residential addresses in the United States. U.S. 
Census Bureau provides a list of respondents monthly for the NCVS using a "rotating 
panel" sample design. Households are selected at random, and all individuals of eligible 
age become part of the panel. Respondents in the sample are interviewed every six 
months for three years. Two interviews occur face-to-face, and the remainders are by 
telephone.  
NCVS respondents report their victimization and that the household as a whole 
(for example, burglary or motor vehicle theft). The data include basic demographic 
information, including the race and ethnicity of the victim and the perceived race and 
ethnicity of the offender.  The NCVS also measures crimes perceived by victims to be 
motivated by an offender’s bias against them for race, ethnicity/national origin, religion, 
disability, sex, and/or gender.  
The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the Decennial Census, surveying households 
across the country to provide, among other things, population estimates. Pertinent to this 
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study, the Decennial Census provides nationwide racial and ethnic information. This 
study includes data from the 2000 and 2010 decennial censuses (Manson, et al. 2017). 
NCVS data from years 2000-2009 were paired with the 2000 census, and years 2010-
2015 the 2010 census. This means a lag exists between the decennial census and 
subsequent years.  
b. Sample 
 
This study includes NCVS data for the years 2003 through 2015, as 2003 is when 
the NCVS began collecting information on hate crimes. All years are combined. The data 
include all offenses reported during this period. However, they omit incidents in which 
the race and/or ethnicity of the offender is unknown since offender race/ethnicity is the 
major predictor of interest. Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the racial composition 
of the victims and offenders in the sample. As the tables illustrate, whereas many 
categories exist for victim race and ethnicity, the NCVS coded offender race into three 
narrow categories: white, black/African American, and other for years preceding 2012, 
and therefore they are reported as such throughout this study. Also of note, race and 
Hispanic/Latino origin are not mutually exclusive categories, and thus all individuals of 
Hispanic/Latino origin also fall within another racial or ethnic category. The NCVS 
provides an option for Hispanic/Latino origin for victims all years, but only 2010 through 
2015 for offenders. The final sample constitutes 23,473 observations, 1,305 
(approximately 6 percent) of which the victims deemed to have a bias motive.  
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Table 3-1: Race and Ethnicity of Victims in Sample 
 
White 
African 
American AI Asian NH/PI Two + Total 
Non-Hispanic 15,806 3,185 269 419 47 713 20,439 
Hispanic 2,697 128 47 32 8 122 3,034 
Total 18,503 3,313 316 451 55 835 23,473 
Percent 79% 14% 1% 2% .002% 4% 100% 
AI refers to American Indian, NH/PI refers to Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 
Two+ refers to individuals reporting two or more racial backgrounds. Race and 
Hispanic/Latino origin are not mutually exclusive categories, and thus all individuals of 
Hispanic/Latino origin also fall within another racial or ethnic category.   
 
 
Table 3-2: Race and Ethnicity of Offenders in Sample 
 
White 
African 
American Other Total 
Unknown (2003-09) 10,007 4,428 2,140 16,575 
Non-Hispanic 3,691 2,002 333 6,026 
Hispanic 731 60 81 872 
Total 14,429 6,490 2,554 23,473 
Percent 61% 28% 11% 100% 
The NCVS began collecting information on offender Hispanic/Latino origin in 2010, and 
therefore this characteristic is unknown for the preceding years, 2003-09. The NCVS 
coded offender race into three categories, White, Black/African American, and Other, for 
years preceding 2012, and therefore they are reported as such for all years here. 
 
 
 
 Tables 3 through 6 provide descriptive statistics on hate crimes specifically. Men 
and women are victims equally (Table 3-3). Whites account for most of those reporting 
hate crime victimization, comprising three-quarters of this population (Table 3-3). 
African Americans equal 14 percent of purported hate crime victims, and victims of other 
racial backgrounds account for the remaining 10 percent (Table 3-3). These 
demographics change noticeably for offenders. Men and women are offenders in 79 and 
28 percent of cases respectivly (some incidents involve both) (Table 3-4).  Whites and 
African Americans comprise an equal share of offenders, around 40 percent each, and 
other racial/ethnic groups account for 16 percent (Table 3-4).  
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Table 3-3: Characteristics of Hate Crime Victims 
Sex Freq. Percent 
Male 673 52% 
Female 630 48% 
Total 1303 100% 
   Race Freq. Percent 
White 984 75% 
African American 186 14% 
American Indian 22 2% 
Asian 43 3% 
NH/PI 4 0% 
Two or More 66 5% 
Total 1305 100% 
   Hispanic/Latino (2010-15) Freq. Percent 
No 1084 83% 
Yes 217 17% 
Total 1301 100% 
   Age Freq. Percent 
Under 18 228 17% 
18-25 211 16% 
26-40 351 27% 
41-65 475 36% 
66+ 40 3% 
 
1305 100% 
 
 
 
Many victims report their incident as involving more than one type of bias (Table 
3-5). Racial bias is the most common type of bias reported, followed by that based on 
ethnicity and national origin (Table 3-5). This trend is true regardless of victim 
race/ethnicity.  
More than three-quarters of purported bias crimes involved assault (intimidation, 
simple assault, or aggravated assault) (Table 3-6). The remainders involved robbery, 
sexual assault, or property offenses.  
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Table 3-4: Perceived Characteristics of Hate Crime Suspects 
Sex Freq. Percent 
  Male 932 72% 
  Female 267 21% 
  Involved Both 95 7% 
  Total 1294 100% 
  Race Freq. Percent 
  White 563 42% 
  African American 533 41% 
  Other 209 16% 
  Total 1305 100% 
  Hispanic/Latino (2010-15) Freq. Percent 
  No 297 83% 
  Yes 62 17% 
  Total 359 100% 
  Age Under 18 18-29 30+ Total 
Single Offender 15% 31% 54% 100% 
Multiple Offenders 
    Youngest 46% 40% 14% 100% 
Oldest 26% 55% 19% 100% 
 
 
Table 3-5: Type of Bias Motive by Victim Race 
 
Percent of Respondents from Each Group Reporting Yes 
Victim Race Race Religion Eth./Nat'l. Or. Disability Gender Sex 
White 55% 10% 28% 15% 26% 9% 
African American 62% 10% 34% 19% 37% 5% 
American Indian 73% 5% 50% 14% 32% 9% 
Asian 84% 7% 67% 7% 19% 2% 
Two or More 58% 9% 21% 9% 33% 21% 
 
 
Table 3-6: Hate Crimes by Offense Type 
Offense Type Number Percentage 
Rape 20 2% 
Other Sexual Assault 16 1% 
Robbery 125 10% 
Aggravate Assault 157 12% 
Simple Assault 431 33% 
Intimidation 442 34% 
Property  114 9% 
Total 1305 100% 
 
 
  
 
61 
c. Measures 
 
This analysis explores the extent to which race and ethnicity influence who is labeled 
and punished as a hate criminal and the degree to which it contributes to racial disparities 
in hate crime enforcement. Specifically, it measures whether offender race/ethnicity 
affects how victims understand, and subsequently report, the offense. It also compares 
incidence rates of arrests to see if racial minorities are disproportionately represented 
among those policed. To this end, the analysis will involve multiple models.  
In the first model, the dependent outcome is whether the victim designated the 
incident a hate crime. Thus, incidents are categorized into a binary variable as either 
having a bias motive or not. Blank and negative responses were coded as “0” to indicate 
the victim noted no bias, and all others were coded as “1” to indicate the victim positively 
identified a form of bias. In 2010, the NCVS added a question asking whether the 
individual believed the incident was motivated by bias. However, until that time, the 
survey asked a series of questions regarding why the offender targeted the victim, each 
relating to a different type of bias (race, ethnicity/national origin, religion, disability, 
gender, or sexual orientation).  Specifically, it asked: “An offender/Offenders can target 
people for a variety of reasons, but we are only going to ask you about a few today. Do 
you suspect the offender(s) targeted you because of your [protected classification]?” If a 
victim answered yes to any of these questions, the data were coded as “1” to indicate a 
positive response.  
In the second set of models, the dependent outcome is whether the victim or another 
member of their household reported the crime to police.  Incidents were categorized into 
a binary variable as either having been reported or not, with “1” indicating the victim or 
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another household member reported the crime, and “0” indicating the police found out by 
other means or not at all. 
In the third segment, the dependent variable is whether the incident resulted in an 
arrest. Three NCVS questions comprised this variable. The first asked whether police 
executed an arrest while they were present. The second asked whether police followed up 
with an arrest after the fact. The third asked generally whether anyone was arrested or 
charged. Incidents were categorized into a binary variable as either involving an arrest or 
not, with “1” indicating the affirmative and “0” the negative, and all other responses were 
coded as missing.  
In the final series of models, the dependent outcome is the incidence rates of arrests 
for each demographic group of offenders. This is calculated using counts of arrests. Thus, 
the variable is coded based on whether the police arrested the individual during the 
incident or at any time subsequently. Three NCVS questions comprise this variable: one 
asking whether the police made an arrest while on the scene, another asking whether 
police made an arrest as follow-up to the incident, and final question asking whether any 
arrests or charges were made. The outcome variable was coded as “1” if respondents 
answered affirmatively to any of these questions, and “0” otherwise.  
For all models, the primary predictor of interest is offender race. For years 2003-11, 
the NCVS coded offender race into three categories, white, black/African American. In 
2012, the NCVS expanded the offender racial categories to include the following: white, 
black/African American, Asian, American Indian, and Pacific Islander. For consistency, 
the racial categories conform to the pre-2012 standards throughout this study, with Asian, 
American Indian, and Pacific Islander offenders grouped into the ‘other’ category. The 
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NCVS did not ask whether the offender was of Hispanic/Latino origin until 2012, and 
therefore separate analyses examine this variable since its addition greatly reduces the 
number of observations by eliminating all incidents occurring prior to the introduction of 
that question. Hispanic/Latino is coded as a binary variable.  The survey also indicates 
whether incident involved a single offender or multiple, and their respective races. 
Beginning in 2012, victims could indicate multiple races, regardless of the number of 
offenders. All incidents involving one offender or multiple offenders of a single shared 
racial category were coded as belonging to that race (“white,” “African American,” or, if 
in another category, “other”). Incidents involving offenders of multiple racial categories 
were coded as “other.” 
Another important fixed effect is victim race and ethnicity. Unlike offender data, the 
NCVS offers a broad menu of options here, including: white only, black/African 
American only, American Indian/Alaska native only, Asian only, Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander only, plus fifteen other categories that are various combinations thereof. Victims 
of one race/ethnicity retained their original label. However, individuals of multiracial 
backgrounds were combined into one group for two or more races, “2+.” Two major 
considerations informed this decision: first, each of these multiracial categories was alone 
quite sparse; and, second, the difficulty of categorizing multiracial individuals into an 
existing group (e.g., is a person identifying as white-African American best described as 
white or African American?). Race and Hispanic/Latino origin are not mutually exclusive 
categories, and thus all individuals of Hispanic/Latino origin also fall within another 
racial or ethnic category. These are two distinct variables in the NCVS and this study. 
Hispanic/Latino is coded as a binary variable.  
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This analysis includes a third race variable to measure the combined effect of 
offender and victim race. This variable includes a distinct category for every offender-
victim race combination (e.g., white offender-African American victim, African 
American offender-white victim, etc.).  
Another covariate of interest is offense. This encompasses 34 categories, including 
attempted and completed offenses spanning violent and property crimes. This variable 
provides an important control both for offense type as well as severity, allowing us to 
measure whether similarly situated individuals of differing racial/ethnic categories are 
perceived and treated alike.  
The final covariate is population. The populations for each racial and ethnic category 
permit the calculation of incidence rates of arrests. Since The NCVS keeps the location of 
respondents confidential to protect anonymity, the analysis cannot calculate arrest rates 
by jurisdiction. Accordingly, it uses national-level demographic estimates.  
d. Analysis 
 
This study examines the role of victim bias in promoting racial disparities in hate 
crime enforcement. It does so by asking how crime victims understand the incident, 
examining whether they attribute it to bias. The study then looks at how these 
interpretations contribute to systemic disparities through a series of analyses. It first 
explores the circumstances under which victims invoke the criminal justice system by 
reporting their crimes to police. This shows how victim bias directly leads to involvement 
with police, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of criminalization. The analyses then 
examines whether racial disparities exist in police response, looking who police arrest for 
hate crimes, the extent to which this is explained by victim actions (reporting), and 
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whether these arrest rates are worse than those seen in other contexts.  This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Offender race is a significant predictor of whether victims interpret a crime to be 
hate-motivated, with victims most likely to ascribe bias to offenses involving African 
American offenders. 
 
H2: Offender race is a significant predictor of whether victims report a crime to 
police, with victims most like to report offenses involving African American 
offenders.  
 
H3: Offender race is a significant predictor of arrest, with police most likely to arrest 
African Americans. Further, while police generally arrest African Americans at 
higher rates than whites relative to their respective populations, the magnitude of the 
effect is significantly greater for hate crimes than non-hate crimes.  
 
 Testing these hypotheses requires measurement of key variables: it involves the 
regression of victim and police responses (the attribution of a bias motive, the decision to 
report, and the incidence rates of arrest) on suspect racial and ethnic identifiers. The 
model must also control for other factors explaining variation, like victim race and 
ethnicity, the incidence of non-hate crimes, and the type and severity of the offense. 
 A finding that the coefficient for African American suspects is a significant 
positive predictor of whether victims attribute bias to a crime, even when controlling for 
offense characteristics and crime rates overall, will suggest negative racial stereotypes 
about African Americans shape victims’ understanding of their victimization. A 
significant negative effect will indicate the opposite, supporting the inference that 
conventional conceptions of the quintessential hate crime prevail (i.e., dominant groups 
victimizing the historically marginalized ones). If offender race predicts whether victims 
report crimes to police, this will suggest victims are more punitive towards African 
Americans, because they are more likely to invite a penal response. Further, it will 
demonstrate how these biases contribute to criminalization overall, because involving 
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police necessarily increases the likelihood of arrest and subsequent punishment. If 
offender race predicts whether arrest occurs, and if the results show disparities in arrests, 
it will indicate police share these biases. If the magnitude of this effect is significantly 
greater for hate crimes than non-hate crimes, it will show how labeling an incident as 
hate-motivated exacerbates systemic inequality. Measuring the effect of victim reporting 
and victim labeling of the crime as hate-motivated will further indicate whether victim or 
police bias plays a greater role in arrest disparities. A lack of significant relationships at 
any stage in the analysis will support the inference that incident-level circumstances other 
than race or ethnicity have greater relevance. 
 Multiple Bernouli logistic models test H1. Model 1A calculates the relative odds 
of a victim labeling an incident as bias-motivated based on offender race or ethnicity. It 
controls for victim race and ethnicity, as well as the type and severity of offense. The 
mathematical formula is as follows: !"#$%&'$'()*+ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%-'()**+,-+.	./0+1)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'0)			+		"##(%&&'()'*	)		 
Level 1: Var(!"#$%&'$'()*|	-*	) 	= -*	(1	–	-*)		 
 
Model 1B mirrors Model 1A, with the addition of offender ethnicity as a fixed 
effect. The mathematical formula is as follows: !"#$%&'$'()*+ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%-'()**+,-+.	./0+1)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'0)			+		"##(%&&'()'*	)		 
+	"#$(&''()*(+	,-./0)-12	)		 
Level 1: Var(!"#$%&'$'()*|	-*	) 	= -*	(1	 −	-*)		 
 
Model 2 calculates the relative odds of a victim labeling an incident as bias-
motivated based on the combined effect of offender and victim race/ethnicity. It controls 
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for the type and severity of offense, as well as Hispanic ethnicity. The mathematical 
formula is as follows: !"#$%&'$'()*+ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%-%'()*+,	+-./-0)		 + !"#$%&(()*+),	.)/012)*3)			+!"#(%&&'()'*	,-./0(-12)			+	"#$(&''()*(+	)		  
Level 1: Var(!"#$%&'$'()*+|	.*	) 	= .*	(1	 −	.*)		 
 
 Two Bernouli logistic models test H2. Model 3A measures the relative odds that a 
victim will report an incident to police when the offender is white, African American, or 
of another race/ethnicity. It controls for victim race and ethnicity, the type and severity of 
the offense, as well as whether it was perceived as a hate crime. The mathematical 
formula is as follows: !"#$!%"&'( 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%-'()**+,-+.	./0+1)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'0)			+		"##(%&&'()'*	)		 
+		"#$(&'()*+,),-./	)		 
Level 1: Var(!"#$!%"&'|	*'	) 	= *'	(1	–	*')		 
 
Model 3B mirrors Model 3A, but with the addition of offender ethnicity as a fixed 
effect. The mathematical formula is as follows: !"#$!%"&'( 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%&'()**+,-+.	./0+1)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'0)			+		"##(%&&'()'*	)		 
+		"#$(&'()*+,),-./	)		+	"#$(&''()*(+	,-./0)-12	)		 
Level 1: Var(!"#$!%"&'|	*'	) 	= *'	(1	–	*')		 
 
 Several models test H3. The first of these is Model 4A, a Bernouli model 
measuring the relative odds of an incident resulting in an arrest based on the race of the 
suspect, whether the victim labeled the crime as hate-motivated, and whether the victim 
reported it to police. It also tests the interactions of offender race and whether the victim 
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labeled the crime as hate-motivated or reported it to police respectively. The 
mathematical formula is as follows: !""#$%#&'( 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" + !$%&(())*+,*-	-/0*1)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'0)			+		"##(%&&'()'*	)		 
+		"#$(&'()*+,),-./	)		+	"#$ %&'(%)&*+	 + "#-.#/ 0123'%&3&4)+	 ((66&4*&%	%27&+) 	+"#9.#: %&'(%)&*+	 ((66&4*&%	%27&+)		
Level 1: Var(!""#$%#&	(()*|	,)* 	) 	= ,)*	(1	 −	,)*)		 
 
The same model is repeated for Model 4B, but with the addition of offender 
ethnicity as a fixed effect. It also tests the interactions of offender ethnicity and whether 
the victim labeled the crime as hate-motivated or reported it to police respectively. !""#$%#&'( 		 ~ Bernoulli (!"# 		) 
logit(!"# 		) = !" 	+	!%&'()**+,-+.	./0+1)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'0)			+		"##(%&&'()'*	)		 
+		"#$ %&'()*+(+,-.	 			+	"#$ %&'(%)&*+	 + "#-.#/ 0123'%&3&4)+	 ((66&4*&%	%27&+) 	+"#9.#: %&'(%)&*+	 ((66&4*&%	%27&+)		
+ !"#(%&&'()'*	,-./0(-12)		+	"#$ %&'()*+(+,-.	 (011+,2+*	3&()',&4.)		 
+ !"# $%&'$(%)*	 ('--%.)%$	/01&2.03*)		 
Level 1: Var(!""#$%#&	(()*|	,)* 	) 	= ,)*	(1	 −	,)*)		 
 
To further test H3, two Poisson regression models measure arrests rates across 
racial and ethnic groups of offenders, providing incidence rates of arrests given relative 
populations nationwide. Model 5A examines non-hate incident rates ratios of offender 
groups based on racial categories, controlling for the population of each racial group as 
an exposure variable. Model 5B repeats the test, examining offender groups based in 
Hispanic ethnicity, controlling for Hispanic population as an exposure variable. The 
models are multilevel because they involve counts by geographic area (United States), 
with level one representing incident-related characteristics (victim, offender, and offense 
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attributes), and level two representing nationwide demographic characteristics. The 
mathematical formula for Model 5A is as follows: !"! − ℎ%&'	)!*)+'!&,-. 		~Poisson (πij) 
ln(πij) = !"# 	+	!&'((*++,-.,/	/01,2#)		 + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./0)			+!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'01)			+		"##(%&&'()'*+) 	+		 
ln(racial group populationij)  
Level 2: !"#			~ N [0, !"		u0] 
Level 1: Var(!"!-ℎ%&'	)!*)+'!&,-.|	0-. 	)			= 	"#$ 		 
 
The mathematical formula for Model 5B is as follows: !"! − ℎ%&'	)!*)+'!&,-. 		~Poisson (πij) 
ln(πij) = !"# 	+	!&'((*++,-.,/	/01,2#)  + !"#$(&'()'*	,-(./0)	  +!"#(%&'(&)	+&,-./&'01)	  +		"##(%&&'()'*+) 	+  
ln(Hispanic group populationij) +	"#$(&''()*(+	,-./0)-12	)  
Level 2: !"#			~ N [0, !"		u0] 
Level 1: Var(!"!-ℎ%&'	)!*)+'!&,-.|	0-. 	)			= 	"#$ 		 
 
Models 6A and 6B duplicate 5A and 5B respectively, substituting hate-motivated 
incidents for those non-hate incidents.  
III. Results 
 
To test H1, victims’ attributions of bias were regressed on available variables for 
offender race and ethnicity (white, African American, other, and then – for years 2012-15 
– Hispanic), controlling for victim race and ethnicity (white, African American, Asian, 
American Indian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 2 or more races, and Hispanic) as 
well as type and severity of offense. Model 1A calculates the relative odds of a victim 
labeling an incident as bias-motivated based on offender race (Table 3-7). Model 1B adds 
offender ethnicity as a fixed effect (Table 3-7). Model 2 examines the combined effect of 
offender and victim race/ethnicity, controlling for the type and severity of offense (Table 
3-8).  
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Offender race and ethnicity are significant. The coefficients for offenders who were 
African American and ‘other’ are significant positive predictors of whether a victim 
interprets the incident as hate-motivated (Models 1A and 1 B, Table 3-7). Likewise, the 
coefficient for Hispanic offenders has a significantly positive effect (Model 1B). 
Incidents involving African American offenders have about 2.5 the odds of receiving a 
hate designation than those involving white offenders. Incidents with offenders of other 
non-white categories have about twice the odds of whites, and Hispanic offenders have 
1.75 the odds of non-Hispanics.   
Victim race and ethnicity have mixed significance. Across models, the coefficient for 
African American victims is a significant negative predictor of whether a crime is 
considered hate-motivated (Models 1A and 1B, Table 3-7).  The coefficients for 
American Indian, Asian, and Hispanic victims have a significant positive effect (Model 
1A, Table 3-7) that is lost with the addition Hispanic offender as a fixed effect (Model 
1B, Table 3-7). The coefficient for Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander victims is not 
significant. African American victims have about two-thirds the odds of labeling their 
incidents bias-motivated than whites. Victims who are Asian, two or more races, and 
Hispanic had 1.38, 1.31, and 1.18 the odds of whites respectively, but the effect is 
insignificant when controlling for whether the offender was Hispanic. 
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Table 3-7: Odds of Victims Interpreting Incident as Hate-Motivated 
Based on Offender Race/Ethnicity 
 
Model 1A: Race Model 1B: Race & Hispanic 
 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Offender Race 
          White (ref) 
          Black 2.47 0.00 *** 2.15 2.82 2.61 0.00 *** 2.02 3.37 
Other 2.10 0.00 *** 1.77 2.49 1.90 0.00 ** 1.27 2.86 
           Victim Race 
          White (ref) 
          Black 0.64 0.00 *** 0.54 0.77 0.65 0.02 ** 0.46 0.92 
AI 1.14 0.55 
 
0.73 1.79 1.06 0.90 
 
0.42 2.68 
Asian 1.38 0.05 * 0.99 1.92 1.44 0.25 
 
0.77 2.71 
PI 1.24 0.68 
 
0.44 3.5 1.86 0.42 
 
0.42 8.33 
Two + 1.31 0.04 * 1.01 1.71 1.48 0.08 
 
0.96 2.3 
           Ethnicity 
          Non-Hispanic (ref) 
         Victim 
Hispanic 1.18 0.04 * 1.01 1.38 1.14 0.40 
 
0.84 1.53 
Offender 
Hispanic 
     
1.74 0.00 ** 1.27 2.39 
           Offense 0.97 0.00 *** 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.00 *** 0.96 0.97 
           Constant 0.08 0.00 *** 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.00 *** 0.06 0.09 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. NH/PI refers to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander. AI denotes American 
Indian. Other refers to all offenders who are neither identified as just white or just 
African American, including those of multiple racial/ethnic identities. 2 or more means 
victims who identify with more than a single racial/ethnic backgrounds.  
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Table 3-8: Odds of Victims Interpreting Incident as Hate-
Motivated By Offender-Victim Race/Ethnicity Combinations 
 Model 2 
 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
      Offender-Victim Combination 
    White-White 0.14 0.00 *** 0.08 0.22 
White-AI 0.24 0.03 ** 0.07 0.84 
White-Asian 0.60 0.31 
 
0.22 1.62 
White-NH/PI 0.45 0.47 
 
0.05 3.84 
White-Two+ 0.15 0.00 *** 0.06 0.36 
African Am.-White 0.52 0.01 ** 0.31 0.87 
African Am.-African Am. 0.13 0.00 *** 0.07 0.24 
African Am.-AI 0.49 0.37 
 
0.10 2.33 
African Am.-Asian 0.53 0.21 
 
0.20 1.41 
African Am.-NH/PI 1.00 
    African Am.-Two+ 0.80 0.58 
 
0.37 1.75 
Other-White 0.30 0.00 *** 0.37 0.58 
Other-African Am. 0.46 0.18 
 
0.15 1.43 
Other-AI NA 
    Other-Asian NA 
    Other-NH/PI 1.53 0.73 
 
0.14 16.49 
Other-2+ 0.66 0.41 
 
0.24 1.77 
      Ethnicity 
     Non-Hispanic (ref) 
     Victim Hispanic 1.11 0.49 
 
0.83 1.50 
Offender Hispanic 1.53 0.01 ** 1.11 2.12 
      Offense 0.97 0.00 *** 0.96 0.97 
      Constant 0.47 0.00 ** 0.28 0.77 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. NH/PI refers to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander. AI denotes American 
Indian. Other refers to all offenders who are neither identified as just white or just 
African American, including those of multiple racial/ethnic identities. 2 or more means 
victims who identify with more than a single racial/ethnic backgrounds.  
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A few offender-victim combinations had a significant negative effect, including: the 
coefficients for African American offender plus white or African American victims; the 
coefficients for white offender plus white, American Indian, or two +; and the coefficient 
for other offender and white victim (Model 2, 8). These combinations were less likely to 
be labeled a hate crime than those incidents in which the offender was white and the 
victim was African American. All other coefficients for offender-victim combinations 
lacked significance.  
The coefficients for type and severity of offense are also significant across models 
(Models 1A and 1B, Table 3-7; Model 2, Table 3-8). However, the tests did not 
categorize this variable in any particular order or designate a reference group, having no 
theoretical impetus to do so. Accordingly, neither table provides a breakdown by offense 
category. 
To test H2, the variable representing whether the victim (or another household 
member) reported the crime to police was regressed on available variables for offender 
race – white, African American, other, and then – for years 2012-15 – Hispanic), 
controlling for victim race and ethnicity (white, African American, Asian, American 
Indian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 2 or more races, and Hispanic), type and 
severity of offense, and whether the crime was bias-motivated. Model 3A calculates the 
relative odds of a victim reporting the crime to police based on the offender race. Model 
3B adds offender ethnicity as a fixed effect. See Table 3-9 below. 
  
  
 
  
 
74 
Table 3-9: Odds of a Victim Reporting Crime to Police 
 
Model 3A: Race Model 3B: Hispanic Offender Added 
 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Offender Race 
          White (ref) 
          Black 1.18 0.00 *** 1.10 1.27 1.13 0.07 
 
0.99 1.29 
Other 0.92 0.06 
 
0.80 1.00 0.87 0.22 
 
0.69 1.09 
           Victim Race 
          White (ref) 
          Black 1.05 0.27 
 
0.96 1.15 1.01 0.88 
 
0.86 1.20 
AI 0.75 0.03 * 0.59 0.97 0.71 0.16 
 
0.45 1.14 
Asian 0.95 0.61 
 
0.78 1.16 0.86 0.45 
 
0.58 1.27 
NH/PI 0.80 0.46 
 
0.44 1.46 0.82 0.68 
 
0.31 2.12 
Two or more 0.83 0.02 * 0.71 0.97 0.77 0.05 * 0.60 0.99 
           Ethnicity 
          Non-Hispanic (ref) 
         Victim Hispanic 1.00 0.45 
 
1.00 1.12 1.13 0.12 
 
0.97 1.32 
Offender 
Hispanic 
     
1.1 0.25 
 
0.94 1.30 
           Hate Crime 
          Non-Hate (ref) 
          Hate 0.74 0.00 *** 0.66 0.84 0.8 0.07 
 
0.64 1.02 
           Offense 0.99 0.00 *** 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 *** 0.99 0.99 
           Constant 0.65 0.00 
 
0.62 0.70 0.67 0.00 *** 0.60 0.75 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. NH/PI refers to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander. AI denotes American 
Indian. Other refers to all offenders who are neither identified as just white or just 
African American, including those of multiple racial/ethnic identities. 2 or more means 
victims who identify with more than a single racial/ethnic backgrounds. 
 
 
The coefficient for African American offender is a significant positive predictor 
of whether the victim reported the incident to police. The odds of the victim doing so are 
about one-and-one-fifth times higher for African Americans than whites. However, this 
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coefficient is only marginally significant (P>z = .068) with the addition of the fixed effect 
for Hispanic offender (Model 3B, Table 3-9). The coefficient for ‘other’ and Hispanic 
offenders has no statistical significance.  
For the most part, the coefficients for victim race are not significant predictors of 
whether a crime was reported to police (Models 3A and 3B, Table 3-9). The exceptions 
are the coefficients for American Indian victims and victims of two or more racial 
identities, each having a significant negative effect. These victims have .75 and .83 the 
odds of reporting their crimes to police respectively compared to whites.  
The coefficient for type and severity of offense is significant across models 
(Models 3A and 3B, Table 3-9). Like before, the tests do not categorize this variable in 
any particular order or designate a reference group, and therefore Table 3-8 provides no 
breakdown by offense category. The perceived presence of a bias motive has a significant 
negative effect, though this significance disappears with the addition of Hispanic offender 
as a fixed effect. 
Testing H3 involved several tests. In the first of these, the binary variable 
signifying whether the incident resulted in an arrest (yes or no) was regressed on offender 
race, whether the incident was a hate crime, whether the incident was reported, as well as 
the interactions between either of these latter two variables and offender race (Models 4A 
and 4B, Table 3-10). The models also controlled for victim race, victim ethnicity, and 
offense type. Model 4B added a fixed effect for offender ethnicity. The coefficient for 
African American offenders was a significant negative predictor of whether an incident 
resulted in arrest (OR=.81). The coefficient for whether the incident was labeled a hate 
crime was also significantly negative (OR=.45), as was that which represented whether 
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the incident was reported (OR=.83). However, the interaction between the coefficients for 
African American offenders and whether the incident was a hate crime was significantly 
positive (OR=1.72). These coefficients lost their significance when reducing the sample 
in Model 4B to only incidents in which offender ethnicity was known (Model 4A 
N=10,595; Model 4B N=3,028). Victim ethnicity was significantly negative across 
models (OR=.81 in Model 4A; OR=.67 in Model 3B). Offense type was also significant. 
The models showed no other significant relationships.  
To further test H3, arrests were regressed on available variables for offender race – 
white, African American, other, and then – for years 2012-15 – Hispanic), controlling for 
each group’s respective nationwide population (exposure), victim race and ethnicity 
(white, African American, Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 2 
or more races, and Hispanic), as well as type and severity of offense. Model 5A 
calculates the incidence rates of arrests based on offender race for non-hate offenses, and 
Model 5B adds offender ethnicity as a fixed effect (Table 3-11). Model 6A measures the 
incidence rates of arrests based on offender race for hate-motivated offenses, and Model 
6B adds offender ethnicity as a fixed effect (Table 3-12). Models 5B and 6B cannot 
calculate incident rates ratios for racial groups because the models employ the exposure 
variable for Hispanic population, not racial populations. For this reason, these two 
models omit the breakdown of incident rates ratios for these groups. However, Models 
5A and 6A provide incident rates ratios by racial group.  
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Table 3-10: Odds of Arrest Based on Race, Bias Motive, and Whether 
Reported 
 
Model 4A: Race Model 4B: Ethnicity 
 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Offender Race (White ref) 
          African Am. 0.81 0.03 * 0.67 0.98 0.95 0.78 
 
0.66 1.36 
Other 1.08 0.55 
 
0.84 1.38 1.11 0.75 
 
0.58 2.12 
           Hate Crime (Non-Hate Ref) 
         Hate 0.45 0.00 *** 0.33 0.63 0.54 0.06 
 
0.28 1.02 
           Hate*Offender Race (No-White ref) 
        Yes-African Am. 1.70 0.03 * 1.04 2.69 0.99 0.99 
 
0.41 2.42 
Yes-Other 1.16 0.65 
 
0.62 2.17 0.88 0.88 
 
0.16 4.93 
           Reported (No ref) 
          Yes 0.83 0.00 ** 0.74 0.94 1.03 0.85 
 
0.80 1.32 
           Reported*Offender Race (No-White Ref) 
       Yes-African Am. 0.88 0.228 
 
0.71 1.09 0.83 0.36 
 
0.55 1.24 
Yes-Other 0.84 0.259 
 
0.63 1.13 0.99 0.98 
 
0.46 2.11 
           Victim Race (White ref) 
          African Am 1.13 0.10 
 
0.98 1.30 0.96 0.75 
 
0.73 1.25 
AI 1.38 0.07 
 
0.98 1.95 1.24 0.51 
 
0.66 2.33 
Asian 0.75 0.11 
 
0.53 1.06 0.66 0.24 
 
0.33 1.31 
Two or more 0.80 0.19 
 
0.61 1.05 0.88 0.57 
 
0.56 1.38 
           Ethnicity (Non-Hispanic ref) 
         Victim 0.81 0.00 ** 0.71 0.93 0.67 0.00 ** 0.52 0.87 
Offender - - - - - 1.00 0.99 
 
0.61 1.66 
           Hate*Hispanic Offender (No-Non-Hispanic ref) 
      Yes-Hispanic - - - - - 1.03 0.96 
 
0.35 3.04 
           Reported*Hispanic Offender (No-Non-Hispanic ref) 
     Yes-Hispanic - - - - - 0.90 0.72 
 
0.51 1.60 
           Offense 0.98 0.00 *** 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.00 *** 0.97 0.98 
Intercept 0.77 0.00 *** 0.69 0.87 0.69 0.00 ** 0.54 0.88 
  
 
78 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. Pacific Islander victims were included as a control, but omitted from the table 
due to small sample size.  
 
 
The coefficients for African American, ‘other,’ and Hispanic offenders are significant 
positive predictors of incidence rates ratios of arrests. This holds true for both non-hate 
and hate crimes (Tables 3-11 and 3-12). The expected number of arrests is 4.88 times 
greater for African Americans than whites for non-hate crimes, and 7.24 times greater for 
hate crimes (Models 5A, Table 3-11; Model 6A, Table 3-12). The expected number of 
arrests is 5.85 times greater for ‘other’ offenders than whites for non-hate crimes, and 
6.76 times greater for hate crimes (Models 5A, Table 3-11; Model 6A, Table 3-12). The 
expected number of arrests is nearly seven times greater for Hispanics than non-
Hispanics for both non-hate and hate offenses (Models 5B, Table 3-11; Model 6B, Table 
3-12). 
The coefficient for Hispanic victim is a significant negative predictor of arrest for 
non-hate crimes, with the expected number of arrests .85 that of whites (Model 5A, Table 
3-11). This number changes to .71 with the addition of Hispanic offender as a fixed 
effect, and when controlling Hispanic population by designation it as the exposure 
variable (Model 5B, Table 3-11). The coefficient for Hispanic victim is not statistically 
significant for hate crimes (Table 3-12). The coefficients for other victim racial and 
ethnic categories are not significant predictors for either non-hate or hate crimes.  
The coefficient for type and severity of offense is significant across models, 
except for Model 6B which measures hate crime arrests with the addition of Hispanic 
offender as a fixed effect. As was the case previously, these tests do not categorize the 
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variable or designate a reference group, and therefore neither Tables 11 nor 12 provide a 
breakdown by offense category.  
 
Table 3-11: Incidence Rates Ratios for Arrests for Non-Hate Crimes 
 
Model 5A: Race Model 5B: Ethnicity 
 
IRR P>z 
95 % Conf. 
Interval IRR P>z 
95 % Conf. 
Interval 
Offender Race 
     
0.95 0.40 
 
0.84 1.07 
White (ref) 
          Black 4.88 0 *** 4.41 5.41 
     Other 5.85 0 *** 5.17 6.63 
     
           Victim Race 
     
0.97 0.50 
 
0.91 1.05 
White (ref) 
          Black 1.09 0.16 
 
0.97 1.24 
     AI 1.25 0.12 
 
0.94 1.65 
     Asian 0.83 0.24 
 
0.61 1.13 
     NH/PI 1.07 0.88 
 
0.45 2.58 
     Two or more 0.85 0.18 
 
0.67 1.08 
     
           Ethnicity 
          Non-Hispanic (ref) 
          Victim Hispanic 0.85 0.02 ** 0.76 0.96 0.71 0.00 ** 0.57 0.9 
Offender Hispanic 
     
6.89 0.00 *** 5.45 8.71 
           Offense 0.98 0.00 *** 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.00 *** 0.98 0.99 
           Constant 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 
Exposure 
(Population) 1 
    
1 
     
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. NH/PI refers to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander. AI denotes American 
Indian. Other refers to all offenders who are neither identified as just white or just 
African American, including those of multiple racial/ethnic identities. 2 or more means 
victims who identify with more than a single racial/ethnic backgrounds. Model 5B 
merely uses racial categories as controls, and omits their respective incidence rates ratios 
since the model already had an exposure variable (Hispanic/non-Hispanic population) 
and therefore could not control for their populations.  
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Table 3-12: Incidence Rates Ratios for Arrests for Hate Crimes 
 
Model 6A: Race Model 6B: Ethnicity 
 
IRR P>z 
95 % Conf. 
Interval IRR P>z 
95 % Conf. 
Interval 
Offender Race 
     
0.92 0.80 
 
0.50 1.70 
White (ref) 
          Black 7.24 0.00 *** 4.82 10.88 
     Other 6.76 0.00 *** 3.9 11.72 
     
           Victim Race 
     
0.98 0.90 
 
0.70 1.32 
White (ref) 
          Black 0.96 0.86 
 
0.58 1.61 
     AI 1.48 0.51 
 
4.67 4.69 
     Asian 0.59 0.36 
 
0.18 1.86 
     NH/PI 0 0.98 
        Two or more 0.64 0.45 
 
0.20 2.03 
     
           Ethnicity 
          Non-Hispanic (ref) 
          Victim Hispanic 0.92 0.75 
 
0.55 1.52 1.36 0.48 
 
0.60 3.20 
Offender Hispanic 
     
6.92 0.00 *** 2.70 17.44 
           Offense 0.97 0.02 * 0.95 1 0.96 0.15 
 
0.90 1.01 
           Constant 0.00 0.00 *** 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 
Exposure 
(Population) 1 
    
1 
     
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. NH/PI refers to Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander. AI denotes American 
Indian. Other refers to all offenders who are neither identified as just white or just 
African American, including those of multiple racial/ethnic identities. 2 or more means 
victims who identify with more than a single racial/ethnic backgrounds. Model 6B 
merely uses racial categories as controls, and omits their respective incidence rates ratios 
since the model already had an exposure variable (Hispanic/non-Hispanic population) 
and therefore could not control for their populations.  
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IV. Discussion 
a. Evidence Consistent With the Racial Bias Orientation to Hate Crime 
This chapter set out to explore whether offender race/ethnicity shapes how 
victims interpret and respond to crime. Outside of the experimental setting and under real 
world duress, do people view African Americans as the quintessential hate crime victim 
or the prototypical criminal offender? In other words, which predominates with regards to 
hate crimes: the civil rights orientation or the racial bias orientation? To answer these 
questions, this study examines whether offender race/ethnicity predicts if victims will 
interpret incidents as hate-driven or report incidents to police. It also explores the extent 
to which racial and ethnic groups are overrepresented among arrestees for both non-hate 
and hate crimes. If negative racial stereotypes about African Americans shape victims’ 
understanding of their victimizations, we should find the odds of victims labeling their 
crimes as hate-driven are significantly greater when the perpetrator is African American, 
regardless of crime rates or the type and severity of offense. Similarly, they will act more 
punitively by reporting crimes involving African Americans to police.  
 The results provide preliminary evidence consistent with the racial bias 
orientation to hate crime. As H1 predicts, offender race and ethnicity are significant 
predictors of whether victims interpret crimes as hate-motivated (Models 1A and 1B, 
Table 3-7). The odds of incidents involving African Americans receiving such a label are 
about two-and-a-half times greater than those involving whites. Incidents with offenders 
of other non-white or multiracial categories (“other”) have about twice the odds. Hispanic 
offenders are 1.75 times as likely as non-Hispanics to receive this designation. These 
results hold true while controlling for the type and severity of the offense, as well as 
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victim racial and ethnic characteristics. Victims are significantly more likely to consider 
their victimization a hate crime when the perpetrator is non-white and/or Hispanic, 
especially if that perpetrator is African American.  
 At the same time, African American victims are significantly less likely to ascribe 
bias to their victimization (Models 1A, 1B, 1C, Table 3-7). In fact, they are about two-
thirds as likely to do so. Put another way, the odds of a white victim interpreting their 
victimization as a hate crime are significantly higher than that of an African American 
victim. This is in contrast to other racial minorities, where we see the opposite effect: 
Victims who are Asian or two or more races have 1.38 and 1.31 the odds of whites 
respectively (Models 1A and 1B, but not 1C, Table 3-7); and Hispanics have 1.18 the 
odds of non-Hispanics (Model 1C, Table 3-7).  
Examining offender-victim race/ethnicity combinations has little effect on the 
analysis. White-on-black offenses are no more likely to be called a hate crime than most 
other inter-racial duos (Model 2, Table 3-8). The only inter-racial combinations that 
differ significantly are those involving African American offenders with white victims 
(which had half the odds), and those involving white offenders with victims who are 
American Indian or of two or more racial backgrounds (.24 and .15 the odds 
respectively). The fact that incidents involving African American offenders and white 
victims have significantly lower odds of receiving a hate crime designation supports an 
inference that victims have a civil rights orientation towards their hate crimes. However, 
this inference quickly loses footing when considering the entire picture: crimes 
purportedly involving hate are nearly twice as likely to involve African Americans 
(Model 4, Table 3-10), African American offenders are two-and-a-half times more likely 
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to be considered hate criminals (Models 1A and 1B, Table 3-7), and most offender-victim 
combinations involving African American offenders having similar odds being 
considered bias-motivated as those involving white offenders and African American 
victims (i.e., those involving victims of American Indian, Asian, Native/Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander, or two or more racial backgrounds) (Model 2, Table 3-8). 
As predicted in H2, offender race is a significant predictor of whether victims take 
the extra step to report their victimizations to police (Model 3A, Table 9). The significant 
relationship exists regardless of victim race/ethnicity, the offense type and severity, or 
whether the crime is hate-motivated. Incidents involving African Americans have about 
one-and-one-fifth the odds of being reported to police compared to whites (though Model 
3B reveals this relationship becomes only marginally significant when controlling for 
whether the offender is also Hispanic). Victims are significantly more likely to react 
punitively towards African American offenders, invoking the penal system by reporting 
the crime to police.  
Collectively, these results paint a very different picture of the typical hate crime 
than that which is widely accepted. The quintessential hate crime is anything but that. 
White-on-black offenses are not the most likely to be seen as hate-motivated. Rather, acts 
of African American offenders have the greatest odds of being labeled hate crimes. 
Meanwhile, offenses perpetrated against African Americans are least likely to be 
attributed to bias. As is the case throughout the criminal justice system, the culpability of 
African Americans is overestimated while the suffering underestimated. Faced with the 
stress of a real-world crime, these findings are consistent with – though do not 
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conclusively prove – the conclusion that victims revert to a racial bias orientation towards 
African Americans.  
b. Evidence that Victim Bias Contributes to Systemic Racial Disparities 
 
This chapter also aimed to measure whether offender race and ethnicity influence 
police response to hate crime. If victims’ negative racial stereotypes about African 
Americans affect enforcement, we should see significantly higher arrest rates for African 
Americans, regardless of the type or severity of the offense. These disparities should 
differ significantly from those seen in the non-hate context.  
The results mixed evidence as to whether victim bias contributes to systemic 
racial disparities. As discussed in the previous subsection, victims are significantly more 
likely to label their victimizations as hate crime, as well as report crimes to police, when 
the perpetrator is African American (Tables 7 and 9). This suggests victims are invoking 
the criminal justice system more for African American suspects, which would logically 
lead to greater police response. However, incidents that victims reported to police are 
significantly less likely to result in an arrest than those reported or discovered by other 
means (Mode 4A, Table 3-10). This indicates the mere act of a victim reporting the 
offense does not significantly increase the extent to which African Americans are arrested 
for hate or non-hate crimes.   
Even still, the fact that the victim labeled the incident as hate-motivated does have 
a significant effect on arrests for African American suspects. Crimes involving a bias 
motive are significantly less likely to result in an arrest, even when controlling for 
whether they are reported to police; arrests are half as likely for hate crimes (Model 4A, 
Table 3-10). Likewise, crimes involving African Americans lead to arrest at significantly 
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lower rates, as well, with .81 the odds of those involving whites (Model 4A, Table 3-10).1 
Nonetheless, police are significantly more likely to arrest African Americans accused of 
hate crimes than whites who commit non-hate crimes; the odds of arrest are 1.72 times as 
great (Model 4A, Table 3-10). The combined effect of the victim labeling the offense a 
hate crime, and the offense involving an African American, significantly increases the 
odds that police will react punitively by taking the suspect into custody.  
Models 5A (Table 3-11) and 6A (Table 3-12) further reveal how these biases 
translate into broader inequalities in enforcement. Police are generally more likely to 
arrest African Americans, but the magnitude of this effect is much greater for hate 
crimes. For non-hate crimes, the incidence rates of arrest are 4.88 times higher for 
African Americans than whites. In startling contrast, the incidence rates of arrest for hate 
crimes are 7.24 times greater for African Americans than whites. In other words, the gap 
between African American and white arrest rates widens by a third between non-hate and 
hate crimes. A similar, though less extreme, trend occurs for other non-white and/or 
Hispanic offenders, though it differs in significant respects. As is the case with African 
Americans, victims are much more likely to say they suffered a hate crime when the 
offender is ‘other’ and/or non-Hispanic (2 higher than white and 1.75 higher than non-
Hispanic reference groups respectively). In addition, like African Americans, both groups 
have disproportionately high arrest rates. For ‘other’ offenders, the expected number of 
arrests is 5.85 greater for non-hate crimes, and 6.76 times greater for hate crimes (Model 
                                                
1 These findings that police are significantly less likely to arrest African Americans may seem 
counterintuitive given the abundance of research to the contrary (see Chapter 1). These unusual findings 
may be explained by a variety of factors. First, NCVS, by definition, excludes victimless crimes (like drug 
offenses), where racial disparities in arrests are often the most egregious. Second, this finding may further 
illustrate victim bias by showing people think they are victims of crime more often when they interact with 
an African American, even when no probable cause exists to support an arrest, thus incidents involving 
African Americans would be less likely to lead to arrest. 
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5A, Table 3-11; Model 6A, Table 3-12). Hispanic offenders have seven-times the odds of 
non-Hispanic offenders of being arrested (Model 5B, Table 3-11; Model 6B, Table 3-12). 
However, incidence rates for Hispanic arrests are the same for non-hate and hate 
offenses; they are very high either way, but do not grow worse.  
These results support, though differ considerably from, the findings in Chapter 2. 
Recall, Chapter 2 used UCR data to regress the number of times police 
cited/summoned/arrested people for hate-related assaults on variables for race and 
ethnicity, and it repeated this test for non-hate assaults. It found the expected number of 
citations/summons/arrests for hate and non-hate assaults was 2.41 and 2.80 times higher 
for African Americans than whites respectively. Thus, both chapters show substantial 
racial disparities in arrests for non-hate and hate-related offenses. However, Chapter 2 
estimates were significantly lower than those in Chapter 3. Also, racial disparities in 
arrests for hate-related assaults were lower, not higher, than those of non-hate crimes. 
Why?  
One explanation may be that the two chapters sample different offenses. The 
UCR analysis included just assault-related offenses (intimidation, simple assault, and 
aggravated assault), whereas the NCVS analysis includes all offense categories. 
Accordingly, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to see whether limiting the current study 
to assaults changed the outcome (this cut 9,387 incidents, 40 percent of the sample). This 
involved replicating Models 1A, 4, 5A, and 6A. Interestingly, constraining the sample to 
assault-related offenses had little effect on racial disparities in non-hate arrests: African 
Americans were 5.38 times more likely than whites to be arrested. However, it did alter 
the results for hate crimes: 5.77 times more likely than whites to be arrested for a hate 
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crime. However, African Americans were still 2.4 times more likely to be labeled a hate 
criminal, and hate crimes were twice as likely to involve an African American offender. 
Further, even when limiting this sample to assaults, the disparities still double those in the 
UCR. Clearly, offense type does not account for these extremely different outcomes.  
Another compelling explanation for the UCR-NCVS discrepancy is the UCR data 
was limited and skewed. As Chapter 2 elucidates, a fraction of agencies report any hate 
crime to the FBI whatsoever (around 12 percent). Moreover, Chapter 2’s sample excludes 
all jurisdictions that report crime statistics via programs outside NIBRS. As a result, the 
sample omits at least two-thirds of UCR reporting agencies for any given year, meaning 
entire states were missing, including New York, Florida, and California, which have 
diverse populations that likely affect patterns of hate crime enforcement. Unlike the 
NCVS, NIBRS is not a representative sample of crime in the United States, especially 
hate crime, and this greatly affects the generalizability of Chapter 2’s models. The NCVS 
provides a more complete and reliable picture of hate crime enforcement. In any event, 
both studies show significant disparities, with African Americans greatly overrepresented 
among arrestees for hate and non-hate offenses alike.  
In sum, victim perceptions of hate crime appear to influence police enforcement. 
There mere fact a victim reported the crime to police does not increase the likelihood of 
arrest. However, the combined effect of the victim labeling the offense a hate crime, and 
the offense involving an African American, significantly increases the odds that police 
will react punitively by taking the suspect into custody. Further, if a victim believes bias 
drove an African American offender to target them, disparities in incidence rates of 
arrests grow precipitously. A similar but subtler trend occurs with other non-white 
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offenders. Hispanics are also more likely to be considered hate criminals, and they endure 
consistently high arrest rates regardless of whether the crime has this designation. These 
results provide intriguing evidence of a negative victim bias towards racial and ethnic 
minorities that may perpetuate systemic racial disparities. 
c. Limitations and Future Opportunities 
This study provided entree into how people actually perceive crime day-to-day 
and the effects of race and ethnicity. The NCVS offered an excellent starting point for 
this inquiry because it directly measures how victims subjectively understand and 
experience hate crime under real-world conditions. Further, the results are generalizable 
because of the demographically representative sampling method.  
Despite its virtues, this research design has its limitations. Most notably, we can 
neither detect nor control for every aspect of a crime that may explain variation. In an 
experimental design, researchers would present subjects with identical scenarios and 
manipulate a single variable, like race or ethnicity, in an attempt to measure its effects. 
This benefit the NCVS cannot provide (although, as discussed, experimental settings may 
lack important real-world effects – like stress – that can alter the results, particularly as 
they relate to racial bias). As a result, the possibility exists this study does not account for 
some factors that may be significant. The NCVS has increasingly added questions that 
allow victims to provide context about the incidents and, over time, comparisons will 
likely become more sophisticated. For instance, the NCVS started gathering information 
on the evidence supporting the inference the crime was hate-motivated beginning 2010. 
However, only half of respondents who experienced a hate crime between 2010-15 
provided a response (277 out of 546), and a large portion of those responses were coded 
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as “don’t know” to indicate uncertainty or “residue” to indicate a response that fell 
outside of the yes/no binary. Thus, the remaining sample is too small for statistically 
relevant analysis. However, future data may provide fruitful information that allows for a 
more qualitative analysis of how and why racial disparities exist in hate crime labeling 
and enforcement.  
Another drawback of the NCVS is its metrics for offender race and ethnicity pre-
2012. During that period, offenders fell into one of three categories: white, black/African 
American, and other. In addition, no variable for Hispanic/Latino ethnicity existed. 
Beginning 2012, the survey underwent significant improvement. Victims could indicate 
the offender was white, black/African American, Asian, American Indian, Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or any combination thereof. It also established a new variable 
for Hispanic/Latino. However, any analysis including pre-2012 data must conform to the 
older method, and thereof lacks accuracy and nuance.  
Looking forward, future research should examine how other members of the 
public, as well as officials throughout the criminal justice system, understand and respond 
to hate crime. Of particular interest is whether actors farther removed from the stressful 
incident can retain a civil rights orientation, and if so, whether that mitigates racial 
disparities. Witnesses, prosecutors, judges, juries, and parole boards play significant roles 
in determining who is punished and to what extent. The media also greatly influences 
public perception, discourse, and action around crime and punishment. Scholars should 
explore whether these players influence racial disparities in hate crime enforcement and 
the nature of this effect. 
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Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, researchers should also focus on the efficacy of 
hate crime statutes more broadly. Limited research exists pertaining to whether these 
laws and their enforcement effectively address bigotry and violence. Similarly, more 
research is needed to see whether less-restrictive policies, like education and anti-poverty 
campaigns, restorative justice, or therapeutic models, may have more meaningful, longer-
lasting, positive impacts. More empirical work is needed to adequately evaluate the value 
of hate crime legislation and to identify evidence-based approaches.  
V. Conclusion 
 
It has taken centuries for the public, policymakers, and the legal system to recognize 
the effect of bigotry and violence on racial equality and develop institutional responses. 
Hate crime legislation is understandably seen as a major victory for civil rights. It is no 
surprise that, facing a potential white supremacist revival, minority rights groups urge 
stronger and harsher enforcement of these laws to communicate zero tolerance and 
promote public safety and security. However, in so doing, they ironically place their faith 
in a system that has time and again been exposed for its deeply engrained racial bias. 
During these times of political turmoil and public panic, researchers have the crucial 
responsibility of empirically assessing the efficacy of policies, as well as their unforeseen 
consequences, to ensure adequate information is available for the development of 
evidence-based responses.  Do hate crime laws operate as intended, and what are their 
potentially perverse impacts? This study set out to assess how hate crime laws play out 
on the ground, examining whether offender race/ethnicity shapes how victims and police 
interpret and respond to a crime. Specifically, it asks whether they are more or less likely 
to label an incident a hate crime or react punitively by calling police based on the 
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perpetrator’s demographic characteristics. When individuals are personally engrossed in a 
stressful criminal event, do they rely on a civil rights preconception of hate crime or do 
they revert to a racial bias orientation that disproportionately villainizes and punishes 
African Americans? 
The results provide compelling preliminary evidence for the latter. Acts of African 
American offenders have the greatest odds of being labeled and punished as hate crimes. 
Meanwhile, offenses perpetrated against African Americans are least likely to be 
attributed to bias. Further, victim perceptions of crime appear to influence police 
enforcement. Victims are more likely to report crimes involving African American 
offenders. While reporting a crime to police, in and of itself, does not increase the 
likelihood of arrest for African Americans, labeling it as hate-motivated does. If a victim 
believes bias drove the offender to target them, the incident is significantly more likely to 
result in arrest, and arrest disparities grow immensely. Police are also more likely to 
arrest other non-white offenders, as well as those of Hispanic ethnicity, for hate crimes. 
These results show some support for the inference that victims have negative bias 
towards racial and ethnic minority offenders, and that these biases perpetuate systemic 
racial disparities. At a minimum, this analysis demonstrates the need for further research 
on whether deeply engrained biases regarding race and crime and pervasive systemic 
racism hinder the ability of the criminal justice system to promote racial equality, as is 
the goal of hate crime legislation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
WEAPONIZING CIVIL RIGHTS: ‘BLUE LIVES MATTER’ AND  
THE USE OF HATE LAWS TO PROTECT THE POWERFUL 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores a new iteration of hate crime laws and its implications for racial 
justice. Since 2016, a wave of states has introduced bills into their legislatures that 
propose extending hate crime protections to police. These are widely known as “Blue 
Lives Matter” (hereafter “BLM”) measures. Traditionally, hate crime laws have aimed to 
protect historically oppressed groups. However, police do not fit that description; they are 
not a vulnerable group needing governmental protections. Quite the opposite: Police are 
empowered by the government as an appendage of it, and they have often wielded this 
power to perpetrate the very acts that hate crimes laws aim to prevent. So why provide 
hate crime protections to police? This study tests two explanations for the introduction of 
BLM laws. First, using data on assaults and felonious killings of police, it considers 
whether heightened or new violence towards police predicts BLM bills. Second, using 
data on police use of force and arrests, it examines whether past police repression 
predicts the BLM bills. This paper cautions that BLM laws, unlike other types of anti-
hate legislation, may undermine equality rather than promote it.  
a. Hate Crime Laws Arose to Protect the Vulnerable from Oppression 
 
An examination of the historical origins and development of hate crime legislation 
reveals the incredible irony of BLM proposals. Hate crime laws aim to protect 
historically oppressed groups. Police do not fall in this category. In fact, police have, at 
times, engaged in the types of repression these laws aimed to prevent.  
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Hate crimes are a form of civil rights legislation that arose from efforts to address 
racial repression. Their origins can be traced back to the first status-based legal 
protections, the post-Civil War constitutional amendments: the Thirteenth Amendment, 
ending slavery; the Fourteenth Amendment, extending citizenship and equal protection of 
the law to African Americans and other groups, and prohibiting state interference with 
many constitutional rights; and the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing voting rights 
regardless of race, color, or prior slave status (Levin 2002). A series of federal statutes 
followed to ensure these protections would be realized: the 1871 Force Act, providing 
enhanced federal authority to protect the franchise of African American people; the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871, criminally punishing government officials and private 
conspiracies that deprive citizens of equal protection or interfere with federal protection 
of civil rights; and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, guaranteeing “full and equal enjoyment” 
to all citizens of public accommodations and conveyances, regardless of race, color, or 
prior servitude. These signified the U.S. government’s first attempt to combat race-based 
mistreatment, and are the earliest versions anti-hate legislation. 
Subsequent forms of legislation also emerged to address bias-based criminality 
targeting African Americans (Levin 2002). With the rise of racial terrorism, sixteen states 
passed anti-lynching laws between the 1890s and 1930s. In response to race riots directed 
at African Americans, states passed group-libel statutes, punishing defamatory statements 
against racial, religious, or ethnic groups. In response to a Klan renaissance in the 1920s, 
states enacted a variety of new policies, including prohibiting masks in public, 
confiscating materials, and banning the group from meeting or parading.  
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In recent decades, hate crime laws have broadened their focus, beyond protecting 
racial minorities to encompass other historically oppressed groups. The contemporary 
anti-hate movement emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century to respond to 
violence stemming from bigotry (Jenness and Grattet 2001). It grew out of a convergence 
of the modern civil rights movement, the contemporary women’s movement, the gay and 
lesbian movement, and the victim’s rights movements. This work has focused on raising 
awareness of, and addressing, bias directed towards minority groups that lead to their 
subjugation.  
Modern day anti-bias laws continue to focus on equality. They often prohibit conduct 
that has historically prevented minority groups from enjoying full citizenship. For 
instance, in the federal arena, these laws include legislation punishing interference with 
civil rights (18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42); interference with enumerated rights including voting, 
obtaining government funded benefits or services, obtaining employment, participation in 
a jury, enrollment in public education, participation in state programs, interstate travel, 
and access to public accommodations  (18 U.S.C. § 245); and interference with housing 
rights (42 U.S.C. § 3631) (Levin 2002).  
Hate crime laws are another form of equality-promoting legislation. The federal 
government and most states have penalty enhancement statutes that provide tougher 
sentencing for certain offenses committed because of group identities that have, as a 
historical matter, been the basis for violence: race, color, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation (Levin 2002). These laws vary on who 
exactly they protect, and as discussed in Chapter 1, they can be invoked to protect the 
dominant group (e.g., whites) because they cover universal categories like race and do 
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not differentiate within the group (e.g., between whites and African Americans) (Jenness 
and Grattet 2001). Nonetheless, hate crime laws today focus on characteristics that have, 
empirically speaking, been the basis of violence, exclusion, and other forms of 
oppression. This has always been the purpose. That is, until now. 
b. Police Have Been the Oppressors, not the Oppressed 
 So how do police fit within this anti-discrimination, equality-promoting 
framework? Police are not a group that has been marginalized in any sense of the word. 
The characterization of police as a vulnerable class is abstracted from historical and 
contemporary context; it misrepresents their past and present social position. Police are 
not a group needing governmental protections. Quite the opposite: Police are empowered 
by the government as an appendage of it, and they have often wielded this power to 
perpetrate the very acts hate crimes laws aim to prevent. 
Indeed, police enjoy tremendous power in the United States politically, legally, 
and physically. Police have significant political clout through their unions and other law 
enforcement interest groups (e.g., Bies 2017). These organizations advocate for policies 
and employment contracts that prevent officer oversight and accountability. Police also 
enjoy strong public support. Most Americans have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of 
confidence in law enforcement (Jones 2015). Further, the law powers police to stop, 
search, and arrest people for the smallest of infractions, regardless of their underlying 
motives (Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 2001; Whren v. Untited States 1996). Police can 
also use a continuum of force, sometimes lethal, and courts largely defer to police as to 
what is reasonable and therefore constitutional (Graham v. Connor 1989). In addition, 
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departments equip their officers with military-style weaponry, including tanks, grenade 
launchers, surveillance equipment, and more (Balko 2013).  
 Important scholarship has shown police have more often been the perpetrators, 
not victims, of systemic oppression. This is especially true in the context of racial justice. 
Throughout the United States history, police have greatly hindered racial equality. In the 
southern United States, early police emerged from slave patrols, whose main purpose was 
to prevent slaves from escaping to the North (Vitale 2017). With the abolition of slavery, 
this role evolved. Police ensured slavery effectively continued through the enforcement 
of vagrancy laws, arresting African Americans and leasing them to private employers for 
profit (Alexander 2012; Vitale 2017). Police were also central to voter suppression, 
preventing African American participation in the political process thereby ensuring white 
domination of the system (Vitale 2017). In the North, police helped contain and control 
African Americans, who were feared by other segments of the population, through 
physical violence.  
 Researchers have also outlined how police actively repressed civil rights 
movements of African Americans and other people of color (Vitale 2017). They impeded 
protest by denying permits and beating and arresting protesters. They enabled private 
violence – including bombings and assassinations – through acquiescence. Local police 
and the FBI collaborated to infiltrate, surveil, and entrap individuals in these movements, 
thereby legitimizing arrest. They also conspired to assassinate prominent civil rights 
leaders. Largely in response to these civil rights movements, the Nixon Administration 
waged the Drug War as a race-neutral means to subordinate and control people of color 
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(Alexander 2012). Police have been on the frontlines, leading the charge to criminalize 
and imprison, en masse, people of color throughout the country (Alexander 2012). 
In recent decades, scholars have noted how police continued to play a vital role in 
maintaining the political and economic status quo. Due to austerity beginning in the 
1980s, widespread poverty followed, especially among people of color, and jurisdictions 
responded by enacting laws punishing low-level “public order” behaviors associated with 
poverty (Camp and Heatherton 2016). This is widely known as “broken windows 
policing.” Practically speaking, it gave police the unfettered power to crack down on 
people of color, and that has been the result. As discussed in Chapter 1, study after study 
documents the racial discrimination that pervades police encounters, from stops, to 
searches, to arrests, to uses of force, to murders (see, Fagen et al. 2009; Harris 2002; 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 2016; Civil Rights Division 
2015; Civil Rights Division and U.S. Attorney’s Office 2017). 
This body of empirical work shows police are not a defenseless group in need of 
governmental protection. They are not a class that has faced historical or contemporary 
persecution. Police have awesome powers that allow them to not only defend themselves, 
but also to overpower others, and they have wielded these powers to commit the very acts 
hate crimes laws aim to prevent. Thus, police do not fit within the anti-discrimination, 
equality-promoting framework of hate crime laws.  
c. What Explains Blue Lives Matter Legislation?  
What, then, explains the introduction of legislation extending hate crime 
protections to police? This chapter tests two theories: (a) states consider BLM legislation 
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when police face heightened or new violence; or (b) states consider BLM legislation as 
means to continue controlling and repressing African American communities.   
Proponents of BLM measures claim police need hate crime protections due to an 
increase in hostility and aggression towards police.  In recent years, law enforcement 
interest groups, politicians, and the media have sounded the alarm on a new “war on 
cops” (Casey 2018; National Public Radio 2016; Mac Donald 2016; see also Balko 2015 
for several examples). They argue anti-police resentment and violence has intensified, 
presenting an existential threat to officers and impeding their ability to protect public 
safety. The “war on cops” narrative relies heavily on two sources of evidence to support 
its claims: first, anecdotes of violence towards police, like the 2016 killings of officers in 
Dallas, Texas; and second, protests of police which allegedly create an antagonistic 
dynamic that cultivates anti-police animus and violence.  Some call this latter 
phenomenon the “Ferguson effect,” suggesting the increased scrutiny and criticism of 
police following the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, fueled an increase 
in violence towards police and crime overall (Mac Donald 2016).  
An alternative explanation exists for why states propose extending hate crime 
protections to law enforcement. The threat BLM laws wish to suppress may be a 
democratic one: public discourse around and advocacy for police reform. The Black 
Lives Matter movement arose as a response to police violence towards African American 
communities (Camp and Heatherton 2016), and its protests are most likely to occur in 
places where police have killed African Americans (Williamson, Vanessa, Trump, and 
Levine Einstein 2018). Blue Lives Matter, as the name suggests, launched in response to 
Black Lives Matter (Lynch 2017). The “Ferguson effect,” mentioned above, is a 
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euphemism for the protest activity by Black Lives Matter, which was sparked by Michael 
Brown’s death in Ferguson. BLM proponents insinuate those who critique police are 
actually inciting violence, and therefore presenting a public safety threat that demands a 
severe legal response. I propose states may introduce BLM measures as a means to chill 
protest, not to protect police. If so, we would see BLM proposals in states where police 
have repressed African Americans and where protests are likely to occur. People are 
challenging police power in these states by shining a light on abuse and misconduct and 
demanding greater oversight and accountability. BLM laws may be part of a historical 
effort to keep African Americans in line and maintain the social order by preventing 
advocacy for racial justice and equality.  
Accordingly, this study tests two explanations for the introduction of BLM laws. 
First, using data on assaults and felonious killings of police, it considers whether 
heightened or new violence towards police predicts BLM bills, like BLM advocates 
suggest. Second, using data on police use of force and arrests, it examines whether past 
police repression predicts the BLM bills. 
II. Methods 
a. Data Sources 
 
This study employs five sources of data: a list of BLM bills introduced at state 
legislatures; Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA) from the UCR; 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS); Arrests by Age, 
Sex, and Race (ASR) from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR); and the U.S. 
Census Bureau Decennial Census. The list of BLM bills provides the dependent variable, 
showing what states are acting to provide extra protections to law enforcement officers.  
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Other data sets include predictors of interest: LEOKA shows the number of officers 
killed or assaulted; LEMAS provides the number of incidents involving use of force; and 
ASR offers arrest rates by race. The Decennial Census provides demographic data by 
state, allowing us to control for populations of each racial group.  
i. BLM Bills 
The Huffington Post conducted an analysis of every state legislature to determine 
where BLM bills were introduced in the years 2016 and 2017 (Craven 2017). This study 
uses that analysis. BLM bills are those that propose extending hate crime protections to 
law enforcement officers. Generally, these laws try to achieve this by adding police to the 
list of protected classes, which typically include categories such as race, sex, national 
origin, sexual orientation, and disability. Sometimes (as is the case in South Carolina) no 
hate crime protections currently exist, and so police would constitute the sole protected 
class for these purposes. Table 4-1 provides a list of states that have introduced BLM 
legislation. This study focuses on the introduction stage of bills for two reasons. First, 
BLM laws are a relatively recent phenomenon, and so too few states have passed them to 
allow for statistical analysis of implantation. Second, it provides a meaningful metric for 
measuring where lawmakers and other advocates pushing for the passage of BLM laws, 
even though this does not measure popular support.  
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Table 4-1:  States in Which Lawmakers  
Introduced BLM Bills, 2016-17 
Alabama Mississippi 
California New Jersey 
Connecticut New Mexico 
District of Columbia New York 
Illinois Pennsylvania 
Kentucky South Carolina 
Louisiana Tennessee 
Maryland Texas 
Missouri Washington 
 
Wisconsin 
  
i. LEOKA 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) compiles the UCR. City, county, and 
state law enforcement agencies nationwide submit data on crimes known to police in 
their respective jurisdictions. LEOKA contains information agencies submit to the FBI 
through a monthly report in which they provide information on killings and assaults of 
police. In relevant part, agencies report whether the killings were accidental or felonious, 
and they provide information on all assaults that involved more than verbal abuse or 
minor resistance during the course of arrest. This study includes LEOKA data for years 
1995 through 2015. Table 4-2 provides a tally of felonious killings and assaults of 
officers for these years combined by state. 
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Table 4-2: Totals by State for Each Data Source, All Years Combined 
 
LEOKA: Officers LEMAS: Force ASR: Arrests 
State Killed Assaulted Incidents (2013) AA White 
AK 6 5375 313 49732 363054 
AL 16 5551 913 1310041 1266535 
AR 11 5021 967 748141 1231156 
AZ 27 42471 4657 482793 5398527 
CA 89 168742 12456 4659072 2.35E+07 
CO 11 17028 2377 496844 3900359 
CT 2 14149 2502 816905 1764105 
DC 3 5178 487 105771 15143 
DE 2 9376 346 309062 331830 
FL 42 152805 12733 275701 399745 
GA 38 20173 6529 3251251 1704418 
HI 1 6474 215 32345 344128 
IA 1 10121 892 222837 1197327 
ID 7 5272 272 5303 1127135 
IL 0 4243 6905 2914570 1187694 
IN 32 25968 4481 1050719 1993312 
KS 4 15304 2829 107647 637913 
KY 6 13700 1456 514185 876780 
LA 55 40819 1429 2263509 1421609 
MA 3 12393 1106 429171 1522122 
MD 22 81620 813 3705112 2517238 
ME 0 5097 53 8635 611873 
MI 31 21863 2455 1856421 2614786 
MN 5 4061 706 733577 2166241 
MO 68 49292 3312 2034549 2884023 
MS 22 5295 543 888723 485174 
MT 1 2692 322 1277 247874 
NC 40 49652 3928 3674021 3550568 
ND 1 1733 241 6533 299732 
NE 2 4107 646 320210 1194270 
NH 5 4330 510 9551 472985 
NJ 20 56642 2158 2546109 2605366 
NM 10 15888 561 57061 1424818 
NV 8 9796 311 692133 2118028 
NY 26 34771 4119 5748567 7437605 
OH 17 21417 3405 1670073 2930340 
OK 21 17762 1404 424759 1325610 
OR 5 10464 2081 160755 2300542 
PA 33 57987 1307 2373778 3939599 
RI 2 9127 148 98537 470691 
SC 26 14840 1901 1395131 1373578 
SD 10 2428 594 11918 304732 
TN 16 35600 2975 1629173 2397683 
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TX 95 97071 11169 4667584 1.39E+07 
UT 4 7915 1319 48153 1983145 
VA 41 29469 3519 2151734 2531472 
VT 0 758 205 1224 88500 
WA 12 24008 3154 352610 3285255 
WI 14 14418 2141 1279905 3928816 
WV 4 6037 539 52103 299068 
WY 1 1322 263 8106 476394 
Data include totals for year 1995-2015, with the exception of LEMAS (use of force), 
which includes only 2013 data. AA denotes African American. Bolded states are those in 
which BLM bills have been introduced. 
 
 
ii. LEMAS 
 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics conducts LEMAS, a periodic survey of all state 
and local law enforcement agencies. It gathers information from all agencies that employ 
100 or more sworn officers, and also collects a nationally representative sample of 
smaller agencies. Data obtained include a variety of administrative information about 
agency responsibilities, expenditures, responsibilities of employees, demographic 
characteristics of officers, policies, training, technology, and more. Relevant here, 
LEMAS asks the number of incidents involving the use of force in the prior year.  This 
study includes data from only the most recent LEMAS survey, administered in 2013, 
because that is the first year the survey included a question on the number of use of force 
incidents. Table 4-2 provides the number of use of force incidents by state for 2013. 
iii. ASR 
 
ASR is another series of the UCR. The ASR provides arrest counts by age, sex, 
and race and offense type for each reporting agency. This study includes ASR data for 
years 1995 through 2015. Table 4-2 provides the total number of arrests by state and race 
for all years combined. 
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iv. U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census 
 
The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the Decennial Census, surveying households 
across the country to provide, among other things, population estimates. Pertinent to this 
study, the Decennial Census provides demographic information on households by state, 
including racial and ethnic composition. This study includes data from the 1990, 2000, 
and 2010 decennial censuses (Manson, et al. 2017).  
b. Sample 
This sample encompasses LEOKA and ASR data for all years beginning 1995 and 
ending 2015. It includes LEMAS data from the year 2013, and data from the 1990, 2000, 
and 2010 decennial censuses. LEOKA, LEMAS, and ASR data from years 1995-1990 
were paired with the 1990 Census, years 2000-2009 with the 2000 Census, and years 
2010-2015 with the 2010 Census. A lag exists between the decennial census and 
subsequent years, but it is consistent across all geographic areas. The sample has 1,071 
observations: one for each state and the District of Columbia (51 geographic areas) for 
every year (21 years).  
c. Measures 
 
This analysis explores what factors predict whether state legislators introduce 
BLM legislation. Specifically, it measures whether these decisions are motivated by 
officer safety, as measured through assault and murder rates over time. In the alternative, 
it measures whether these decisions are merely states doubling down on historically 
repressive policies, as measured through use of force and arrests. To this end, the analysis 
involves multiple models.  
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In all models, the dependent outcome is whether state legislators introduced BLM 
legislation in 2016 or 2017. States are accordingly categorized into a binary variable as 
either having a BLM bill introduced or not, with “0” denoting the negative and “1” 
denoting the affirmative. 
Model 1 has two predictors of interest: the number of assaults on officers, and the 
number of murders. LEOKA asks agencies for the totals of felonious killings (murders) 
and assaults of police. These two variables are collapsed by state for each year. This 
analysis uses those yearly statewide counts. This model also includes a fixed effect for 
the total number of officers employed as a control. This number is provide by LEOKA, 
as well, and was similarly collapsed into a yearly statewide count for this study. In other 
words, each geographic area has 21 observations, one for each year (1995-2015) for each 
variable (total assaults and total murders).  
Model 2 has two predictors of interest: the rate of change in assaults between the 
years 1995 and 2015, and the rate of change in murders for that same period. I calculated 
the rate of change by regressing the number of assaults on years for states separately, 
controlling for the total number of officers serving. I then did the same for murders.  The 
coefficients for every state were used to create two new variables – one for assaults, 
another for murders – representing the slope for every state. Therefore, each state has one 
number associated with it: the slope for all years (1995-2015). Note, the rates of change 
for assaults and murders tend to be monotonic, with a relatively linear trend in either 
direction (see Appendix B).  
Model 3 has one predictor of interest: police use of force. LEMAS asks agencies a 
series of questions regarding how they record incidents involving the use of force. For 
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those responding departments that provide a report for every incident, the survey inquires 
as to the total number of incidents involving force. Agencies can respond with a number, 
including “0,” or indicate “unknown.” This sample uses only those answers in which the 
number of incidents was known, and the values reflect the total number of incidents 
noted by the responding agency (thus, 301 of the 1,767 responses were dropped since 
they were missing this information). The data lack a demographic breakdown of 
individuals against whom police used force, and so the variable here provides the 
aggregate counts for all racial and ethnic groups for the year 2013 (which, as discussed, is 
the only year this information is available).  
Model 4 has one predictor of interest: the number of African Americans arrested. 
It also includes a fixed effect for the number of whites arrested as a control. ASR data 
include state totals of arrests for African Americans and whites separately. ASR provides 
the total number of arrests by each racial and ethnic group for adults and juveniles in 
every offense type by agency. For African Americans and whites, I added the arrest 
counts for juveniles and adults together. I then collapsed the two variables by state for 
each year, combining all offenses into one total. The result is two variables: total arrests 
for African Americans by state for each year, and total arrests for whites by state for each 
year. In other words, each geographic area has 21 observations, one for each year (1995-
2015) for each variable (total arrests of African Americans and total arrests of whites).  
This analysis uses the annual statewide counts by racial group. Further, because the 
number of arrests if often in the tens of thousands, I divide the number by 10,000 for the 
statistical calculations to ensure a more meaningful and discernable odds ratio.  
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Models 3 and 4 each include fixed effect variables based on statewide 
populations. Model 3 uses the total population of all racial and ethnic groups combined as 
a control. Model 4 uses the population of African Americans as a control. These 
estimates come from the Decennial Censuses. 
d. Analysis 
This study examines what factors predict whether state legislators introduce BLM 
legislation. It does so by measuring whether a relationship exists between these efforts 
and officer safety, or whether these policies are a continuation or escalation of repressive 
police practices, and therefore predicted by a pattern of such practices historically. This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: The relationship between assaults on police and the introduction of BLM 
legislation is not positive. The same holds true for officer murders. 
 
H2: The relationship between the change over time in assault on police and the 
introduction of BLM legislation is not positive. The same holds true for change over 
time in officer murders. 
 
H3: The number if incidents in which officers use force is a significant positive 
predictor of whether a state introduces BLM legislation. 
 
H4: African American arrests are a significant positive predictor of whether a state 
introduces BLM legislation. 
 
Testing these hypotheses requires measurement of key variables. First, it involves 
regressing whether states introduced BLM bills on the number of assaults and murders of 
officers, the number of incidents involving use of force, and the number of arrests for 
African Americans. The models must also control for other factors explaining variation, 
like the total number of officers serving, the counts of arrests for people other than 
African Americans, and population estimates.   
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A finding that the coefficients for assaults or murders of officers is insignificant or 
negative will suggest decisions to introduce BLM legislation are not actually based on 
founded concerns around officer safety.  Similarly, if the coefficients representing the 
rate of change in assaults or murders of police are insignificant or negative predictors, we 
can infer the introduction of these bills is not a response to a growing need for enhanced 
officer protection.  
A finding that the coefficients for use of force or arrests of African Americans will 
indicate the introduction of BLM bills is fundamentally about maintaining or increasing 
police powers over African Americans. States with repressive policies are fighting to 
protect the social order.  
The four models below employ Bernouli logistic analyses. In all models, i represents 
the geographic area (each state or the District of Columbia) for a given year between 
1995-2015. Model 1 calculates the relationship between a state’s introduction of BLM 
legislation and the number of assaults and murders of officers by year, controlling for the 
number of officers serving in each state in that year. The formula is as follows: !"#$ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!" 		) 
logit(!" 		) =  !" 	+	!%('((')*+(,)		 + !"($%&'(&)*	)		 +	"#(%&%'(	&))*+,-./)		  
Var(!"#$|	'$	) 	= '$	(1	–	'$)		 
 
 
Model 2 measures the relationship between a state’s introduction of BLM legislation 
and the overall rate of change over years in assaults and murders of officers respectively. 
The formula is as follows: !"#$ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!" 		) 
logit(!" 		) =  !" 	+	!%('ℎ)*+,	-*	)..)/01.2)		 + !"($ℎ&'()	+'	,-./).01	)		  
Var(!"#$|	'$	) 	= '$	(1	–	'$)		 
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Model 3 calculates the relationship between a state’s introduction of BLM 
legislation and the number incidents involving police use of force in the year 2013. It 
controls the overall population. The formula is as follows: !"#$ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!" 		) 
logit(!" 		) =  !" 	+	!%('()*+	,-*,.+-/01)		 + !"($%$&'	)%)*'&$+%,-	)		  
Var(!"#$|	'$	) 	= '$	(1	 −	'$)		 
 
Model 4 measures the relationship between a state’s introduction of BLM 
legislation and the number of African Americans arrested each year. It controls for the 
number of whites arrests by year, as well as the African American population. The 
formula is as follows: !"#$ 		 ~ Bernoulli (!" 		) 
logit(!" 		) =  !" 	+	!%(''	())*+,+-)		 + !"($ℎ&'(	*++(,',-	)		 
+	"#(%%	&'&()*+,'-.)		  
Var(!"#$|	'$	) 	= '$	(1	 −	'$)		 
 
III. Results 
 
To test H1, the introduction of BLM legislation was regressed on variables for 
assaults and murders of officers, controlling for the total number of officers serving 
(Model 1, Table 4-3).  The odds ratios for assaults and murders are both insignificant. 
The odds ratio for total officers is a significant positive predictor, though the coefficient 
is very small (odds ratio of 1.00, indicating a nearly 1:1 ratio). 
To test H2, the introduction of BLM legislation was regressed on variables 
representing the rate of change for assaults and murders of officers (Model 2, Table 4-3). 
The odds ratio for change in assaults over time was a significant negative predictor, 
though the coefficient is very small (odds ratio of 1.00, indicating a nearly 1:1 ratio). The 
odds ratio for change in murders over time was not significant.  
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Table 4-3: Officer Safety 
Model 1: Number of Assaults and Murders  
 
Odds Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Assaulted 1.00 0.63 
 
1.00 1.00 
Murdered 1.07 0.13 
 
0.98 1.16 
Total Officers 1.00 0.00 *** 1.00 1.00 
Intercept 0.25 0.00 *** 0.20 0.30 
      Model 2: Rates of Change in Assaults and Murders 
 
Odds Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Change in Assaults 
Over Time 1.00 0.00 ** 1.00 1.00 
Change in Murders 
Over Time 0.89 0.80 
 
0.37 2.16 
Intercept 0.56 0.00 *** 0.49 0.64 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models.  
 
 
 To test H3, the introduction of BLM legislation was regressed on the number of 
incidents in which officers used force, controlling for population (Model 3, Table 4-4). 
The odds ratio for use of force was not significant, but population had a significant 
positive effect. 
 To test H4, the introduction of BLM legislation was regressed on the variable for 
African American arrests, controlling for white arrests and African American population. 
All coefficients were significant positive predictors of whether states introduced BLM 
bills (Model 3, Table 4-4). As the number of African American arrests increases by 
10,000, the odds of a state introducing BLM legislation increases by 1.12.  As the number 
of white arrests increases by 10,000, the odds of a state introducing BLM legislation 
increases by 1.02.   
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Table 4-4: State Repression 
Model 3: Number of Incidents Involving Use of Force 
 
Odds Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
Use of Force 1.00 0.12 
 
1.00 1.00 
Total Population 1.00 0.03 * 1.00 1.00 
Intercept 0.23 0.00 ** 0.09 0.63 
      Model 4: Arrests of African Americans 
 
Odds Ratio P>z 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
AA Arrests 1.12 0.00 *** 1.08 1.17 
White Arrests 1.02 0.03 * 1.00 1.04 
AA Population 1.00 0.01 ** 1.00 1.00 
Intercept 0.20 0.00 *** 0.60 0.25 
Coefficient superscripts indicate these significance levels: * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** 
(p< .001). Bolded coefficients indicate those that are significant at p < .05 or less in all 
models. AA refers to African American. In Model 4, the parameters represent the unit of 
change in odds ratios for every 10,000 arrests (see Section 2(c) above). 
 
 
IV. Discussion 
a. Evidence Undermining Officer Safety Rationale for Hate Crime 
Protections 
 
This chapter set out to explore what factors predict whether states introduce 
legislation extending hate crime protections to law enforcement officers. Historically, 
such protections have covered classes of people who were the targets of violence. Does 
violence towards police predict whether lawmakers propose BLM laws? Even if rates of 
violence are low, has there been a significant uptick in violent incidents to spur such 
efforts? If states propose these bills out of a legitimate concern for officer safety, we 
should expect to see significantly higher rates of assaults or murders against police or, at 
a minimum, a relative increase in violence in those states. 
The results provide compelling evidence undermining the officer safety rationale 
for hate crime protections.  Consistent with H1, neither the rates of assaults nor murders 
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predict whether states propose the measures. Put another way, states in which lawmakers 
proposed BLM protections do not differ significantly from other states in terms of 
violence against police. 
Moreover, the introduction of BLM legislation does not appear to be driven by an 
increase in assaults or murders of police. In fact, a significant negative relationship exists 
between changes in assaults over time and these measures (though the coefficient 
diminutive). BLM proposals are associated with a decline in assaults; states in which 
lawmakers propose these bills are seeing a drop. Further, no significant relationship exists 
between the change in murders and BLM bills. States with BLM bills in the legislative 
queue have not seen an increase in police murders. In sum, the data provide no support 
for the claim that police in these states need enhanced protections. If anything, the 
opposite appears to be the case.  
b. Evidence Consistent With a State Repression Rationale for Hate Crime 
Protections 
 
This chapter proposed an alternative theory for why states consider extending hate 
crime protections to law enforcement. This theory posits lawmakers propose BLM laws 
not to protect police from violence, but rather democratic challenges to police power. 
Under this theory, states with historical patterns of police repression towards African 
Americans will be most likely to put forth legislation further protecting and empowering 
police and, likewise, punishing and disempowering African Americans. 
The results are consistent with this state repression theory. States with more 
repressive police practices are significantly more likely to introduce legislation extending 
hate crime protections to law enforcement. African American arrests predict the 
introduction of BLM legislation (Model 4, Table 4-4). This finding holds true when 
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controlling for the number of whites arrested as well as the African American population. 
As the number of African American arrests increases by 10,000, the odds of a state 
introducing BLM legislation increases by 1.12. White arrests are also significant, though 
to a lesser degree (with an odds ratio of 1.02). Repression of African Americans and also 
whites, as measured through arrests, predict BLM bills in state legislatures. No 
significant relationship exists between use of force and the introduction of BLM 
legislation. However, as discussed in Section VI, I attribute this to underreporting by 
police and sample size.  In conclusion, the results indicate that states proposing BLM 
laws are those in which police have historically exercised broad powers and wish to 
continue doing so.  
c. Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study took the important first step in examining some of the factors that may 
predict the introduction of laws extending hate crime protections to law enforcement. 
Notably, it employed five distinct data sources provided by the federal government to test 
the dominant justification, officer safety, and an alternative explanation, state repression.  
This study merely examined BLM laws at their conception. At least two states – 
Louisiana and Kentucky – have enacted this legislation. Others may follow. Much more 
research will be needed to understand the effects. For instance, researchers should 
examine the circumstances under which police invoke their newfound protections, and 
against whom. Also, scholarship should focus on the possible negative consequences, 
including the potential chilling effect on speech critiquing police and demanding reform. 
Along these lines, research should scrutinize how these policies affect historically 
oppressed groups – like African Americans – and whether these laws have the 
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consequence of undermining civil rights. Finally, as is true for all hate crime legislation, 
researchers should measure the efficacy of these policies in achieving their purported 
public safety goals, and the availability of less restrictive alternatives.  
This research design has noteworthy limitations. Importantly, it relied almost 
exclusively on police assessments of their own work. On the one hand, this fact may 
bolster the study’s findings regarding officer safety. If police were to provide inaccurate 
estimates of their victimizations, we would expect these numbers to be exaggerated 
because it would justify heavy-handed police responses, unchecked discretion, and the 
greater allocation of resources to enhance officer safety. Despite potentially inflated 
numbers, officer assaults and murders were either insignificant or negative predictors of 
BLM bills. Thus, even by their own metrics, police do not face safety concerns 
necessitating protected class status.  
On the other hand, relying on police data is more problematic for other types of 
questions, like measuring the degree of repression in a jurisdiction. Police may 
underestimate their own wrongdoing. Quite significantly, studies have found more than 
half of police killings go undocumented (e.g., Feldman 2017; Bank et al 2015). 
Moreover, use of force estimates also suffer underreporting since many departments fail 
to collect such statistics and, when they do, they rely on records created by officers who 
were involved in the action and who have legal, reputational, and financial incentives to 
lie (e.g., Alpert and Dunham 2004). Further, we might infer those departments lacking 
integrity in their conduct on the street will likewise lack integrity in their documentation 
and reporting of said conduct. They have more to hide, and they have a greater propensity 
towards misconduct generally.  
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Another problem with federal police data is its omission of information pertaining to 
misconduct resulting in no arrest, use of force, or death. For instance, police may engage 
in Terry stops (stops and frisks), and jurisdictions vary in their documentation of these 
encounters. Almost uniformly, police can engage in “mere conversation” with civilians 
without record, even though those conversations can often be highly coercive or 
threatening.  These interactions often breed community distrust, resentment, and conflict 
but, despite their significance, they go largely undetected in our existing data.  
Therefore future research should refine methods for measuring police repression, 
incorporating data from impartial sources, and capturing information currently missing. 
For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics recently redesigned its Arrest Related Death 
statistics program to incorporate information from news outlets and non-police agencies 
to supplement law enforcement and coroner data. Also of note, non-governmental entities 
have begun collecting data on police killings in the United States based on news 
accounts. The Guardian, the Washington Post, Vice News, and Mapping Police Violence 
have created their own databases using such information. Hopefully, these creative 
methods will not only improve our calculations of deaths but also spur other similar 
efforts in other police contexts, like use of force, stop and frisk, and less formal 
encounters.  
Another limitation of this study is its lack of qualitative analysis. More historical 
context would greatly enrich the discussion. Similarly, deeper analyses of discussions 
around these issues – as depicted through legislative history, public meetings, and news 
stories – would further enhance our understanding of the social and political dynamics at 
play. Interviews with stakeholders could also provide a more direct view into the motives 
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behind BLM laws. Another important contribution would be an exploration of the interest 
groups (other than police) supporting these laws, and their respective political agendas.  
V. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation set out to examine hate crime laws and their potentially perverse 
consequences for African Americans. Despite the palpable skepticism of the criminal 
justice system, it has recognized that hate crime laws likely have good intentions. They 
arose from a civil rights movement and attempt to address conduct that arguably hinders 
racial equality. But can the same be said for BLM proposals?  These laws represent a 
significant departure from traditional hate crime legislation in their protection of a group 
that is (1) the government, (2) very powerful, and (3) has a history of perpetuating 
repressive acts that hate crime laws aim to prevent. What are we to make of BLM laws? 
This study tested two possible explanations for why state legislators propose 
extending hate crime protections to police: officer safety or ongoing repression of African 
Americans. The results reject the officer safety rationale for hate crime protections. States 
in which lawmakers proposed BLM protections do not differ significantly from other 
states in terms of violence against police. In fact, they are more likely to have seen a 
decline in violence. Police in these states do not need enhanced protections.  
However, the results are consistent with – though certainly do not prove – the  
state repression theory. States with more repressive police practices – as measured 
through arrests of African Americans – are significantly more likely to introduce 
legislation extending hate crime protections to law enforcement. The results indicate 
states proposing BLM laws are those in which police have historically exercised broad 
powers and wish to continue doing so. This evidence supports concerns that states may 
  
 
117 
be using hate crime laws to protect the powerful, weaponizing civil rights laws to 
suppress movements for racial justice. Further research is needed to fully understand the 
social context of these laws and their future consequences for racial equality. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON CRIMINALIZING OUR WAY TO RACIAL 
EQUALITY 
I. Introduction 
This dissertation set out with two goals. First, it highlighted the need for empirical 
research regarding whether regulating hate actually promotes racial equality. Second, it 
began chiseling away at this larger question by focusing on a particular aspect of hate 
regulation, its criminal penalties, and who bears the burden. Within this focus on 
criminalization, the lens of this dissertation zooms in further, looking at a particular phase 
in the criminal justice system, policing. This chapter synthesizes those findings, and 
situates them within the narrow and broad questions posed in Chapter 1.  
II. What We Learned 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 began the analysis into whether hate crime laws have the 
unintended consequence of promoting racial inequality by contributing to the mass 
criminalization of African Americans. Chapter 2 looked at police-level decisions 
regarding who has committed a hate crime, examining whether any racial ethnic groups 
are overrepresented among hate crime offenders, and the extent to which disparities in 
hate crime enforcement resemble those throughout the criminal justice system. These 
preliminary findings suggest there is cause for concern. Police are less likely to designate 
an assault a hate crime for African American suspects than white, but African Americans 
are nonetheless significantly overrepresented among hate crime offenders, regardless of 
community-level enforcement patterns, though these disparities are significantly lower 
than those seen in non-hate contexts. Likewise, major disparities exist among American 
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Indians. The effects on Hispanics remain unknown. These results indicate hate crime 
enforcement may indeed be a double-edged sword that cuts against those it aims to 
protect.  
 Chapter 3 assessed whether offender race/ethnicity shapes how victims and police 
interpret and respond to a crime. Specifically, it asked whether victims are more or less 
likely to label an incident a hate crime or react punitively by calling police, and whether 
police are more likely to make an arrest, based on the perpetrator’s demographic 
characteristics. Acts of African American offenders have the greatest odds of being 
labeled and punished as hate crimes. Meanwhile, offenses perpetrated against African 
Americans are least likely to be attributed to bias. Further, victim perceptions of crime 
appear to influence police enforcement. Victims are more likely to report crimes 
involving African American offenders, and police are more likely to arrest African 
Americans. If a victim believes bias drove the offender to target them, arrest disparities 
grow exponentially. Police are also more likely to arrest other non-white offenders, as 
well as those of Hispanic ethnicity. These results support the inference that victims have 
negative bias towards racial and ethnic minority offenders, and that these biases 
perpetuate systemic racial disparities.  
Chapter 4 examined another hate crime context involving police, but where they were 
the purported victims. It tried to make sense of Blue Lives Matter laws extending hate 
crime protections to law enforcement, who are neither vulnerable nor historically 
oppressed. This study tested two possible explanations for why state lawmakers introduce 
this legislation: officer safety or ongoing repression of African Americans. The results 
appear to reject the former rationale. States in which lawmakers proposed BLM 
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protections do not differ significantly from other states in terms of violence against 
police. In fact, they are more likely to have seen a decline in violence. Police in these 
states do not need enhanced protections. However, evidence supported the latter 
rationale: states with more repressive police practices – as measured through arrests of 
African Americans – are significantly more likely to introduce legislation extending hate 
crime protections to law enforcement. The results indicate states proposing BLM laws 
may do so in response to Black Lives Matter and to protect police from legitimate 
criticism. This suggests states are using hate crime laws to protect the powerful, and they 
are weaponizing civil rights laws to suppress movements for racial justice.   
Collectively, these three chapters tell the following story. Police generally arrest 
African Americans at disproportionately high rates, even when controlling for type and 
severity of offense. When considering the most reliable and representative data available 
(NCVS), it appears these disparities grow steeply for hate crimes. Victims are much more 
likely to label a crime as hate driven when the offender is African American, and when 
they label it as such, the likelihood of arrest rises precipitously. Yet, when African 
Americans and allies critique these disparities and other repressive police practices, states 
respond by deploying hate crime laws to suppress democratic protest and inoculate police 
from oversight and accountability. All three studies suggest hate crime laws have the 
distorted effect of enabling police repression and undermining racial equality.   
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III. Unanswered Questions 
a. Does Enforcement Perpetuate the Mass Criminalization of African 
Americans? 
 
These findings only begin to answer the question of whether African Americans bear 
the burden of hate crime criminalization. More research is needed to understand these 
disparities throughout the criminal justice process. This dissertation only looks at 
policing. Prosecutors, judges, juries, and parole boards play significant roles in 
determining who is punished and to what extent. A complete answer of this question 
requires analyzing decisions around charging, plea bargaining, pretrial release, 
conviction, sentencing, and parole. This empirical work is necessary to understand how 
officials enforce hate crime laws, against whom, and the attendant burdens.  
b. What is the Value of Criminalization? 
We must proceed with even greater caution when drawing inferences regarding hate 
regulations and racial equality more broadly. Let us assume, without finding, 
criminalization is a burden that African Americans disproportionately bear, and that hate 
crime enforcement perpetuates their mass criminalization. The inquiry into whether 
regulating hate promotes or hinders racial equality does not stop there. We must assess 
whether the benefits are worth the costs. 
i. Deterrence, Rehabilitation, and Restitution 
Understanding the benefits of criminalization requires measuring its efficacy in 
addressing hateful expression and conduct. In other words, how do these laws and their 
enforcement fare in achieving criminal justice objectives – aside from immediate 
incapacitation or sheer retribution – such as restitution, deterrence, and rehabilitation? Do 
the processes empower victims and communities to find resolutions that are restorative 
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and make them whole? Do the laws succeed in stopping or preventing people from 
engaging in hateful expression and/or conduct? Does involvement in the criminal justice 
system therapeutically address the underlying issues within the perpetrator such that they 
are able to function in a diverse society? Some research indicates otherwise: prosecution 
may increase resentment towards minorities because it plays into the offenders’ 
perceptions that they were the victims of oppression by a more socially privileged and 
powerful group (Franklin 2002). Moreover, scholarship has revealed significant 
limitations of the retributive models in addressing the needs of either the victims or the 
offenders generally (see Zehr 1995). More empirical analysis is needed to conclusively 
determine whether anti-hate laws and their enforcement effectively address bigotry and 
violence.  
In considering the efficacy of approaches to combating hate, we should also ask 
whether evidence-based alternatives exist that may be less socially or economically 
costly or more successful. In other words, we may face a false choice in deciding 
between criminalization and unencumbered hate. Less-restrictive policies, like education 
and anti-poverty campaigns, restorative justice, etc., may have more meaningful, longer-
lasting, positive impacts, without the negative consequences. For instance, in other 
criminal justice contexts, therapeutic approaches have been shown to have outcomes 
superior to those seen with punitive models (see, e.g., Warren 2009). More research is 
needed to adequately evaluate the value of hate crime legislation and to identify the most 
empirically grounded ways forward. 
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ii. Norm-Setting Functions of Anti-Hate Laws 
Traditional criminal justice objectives aside, anti-hate laws may have important 
symbolic value. Laws are imbued with social meaning that affects public attitudes and 
behavior. The law has the hegemonic effect of creating a social order that people widely 
accept as neutral, inevitable, and uncontroversial (Crenshaw 1988, discussing Gramsci). 
Legal consciousness therefore defines the boundaries of what people believe to be 
possible. Sometimes, this means the law induces people to accept the oppression of 
themselves or others. However, it can also convince the masses to pursue and support a 
more egalitarian society. 
Considerable scholarship has shown lawmaking shapes public opinion and 
behavior. People care about, and are influenced by, decisions and actions of judges and 
legislators (Matsubayashi 2013; Hoekstra 2000; Hoekstra 1995). Even when it fails to 
directly change individual beliefs, the law affects norm perception (Tankard and Paluk 
2017). People look to the law to gauge how others feel about issues, as a signpost for 
what opinions and actions are acceptable in the eyes of their peers. Sometimes these 
perceptions change individual attitudes, but even when not, they shape conduct because 
people wish to conform their behavior to avoid social rejection (see Tankard and Paluk 
2017 for a review of the literature).  
Significantly here, changes in policy can influence the public with regards to 
minority rights (Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert 2015). For instance, following the 
legalization of same-sex marriage in Iowa, and before Obergefell, Kreitzer, Hamilton, 
and Tolbert (2015) found the decision signaled new social norms that, in turn, compelled 
people to modify their expressed attitudes. Researchers have observed similar phenomena 
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in other contexts, including affirmative action (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001). 
Conversely, anti-immigrant laws have been found to mobilize those already harboring 
anti-immigrant sentiment to become vocal about their prejudices (Flores 2017).  
For this very reason, there has been considerable attention paid to the norm-
setting power of government recently. Prominent civil rights advocates have warned of 
the grave dangers of having leaders acquiesce to, encourage, and provoke bigotry. For 
instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center stated:  
Welcome to Donald Trump’s America. It’s an America where the social norms 
that stitch our society together – the unwritten rules of common decency and 
civilized behavior that have been built up over generations – are unraveling before 
our very eyes. Trump’s racially charged, xenophobic campaign, coupled with his 
attacks on so-called political correctness, not only energized the white 
supremacist movement but gave people a license to act on their worst instincts – 
their anger, their prejudices, their resentments. 
 
(Cohen 2017). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) articulated similar concerns (2018): 
As our nation fights to move forward, our President falls deeper and deeper into 
the rabbit hole of racism and xenophobia. The United States’ position as a moral 
leader throughout the world has been thoroughly damaged by the continuous 
lowbrow, callous and unfiltered racism repeatedly espoused by President Trump. . 
. . This President’s failure to grasp simple ideas of inclusion and maturity is an 
open sore on our democracy that continues to fester. It is clear that the President 
wants to return America to its ugly past of white supremacy . . . “ 
 
Both statements focus on the President’s role as moral and normative leader. 
These advocates know, as research confirms, that government positions on civil rights 
issues matter, not only because they translate into policy, but also because they convey 
codes of civility, decency, and social acceptability. At a time when our most powerful 
officials espouse views of intolerance and dehumanization, having strong legal norms to 
communicate zero tolerance for bigotry and violence may be all the more important. 
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Anti-hate laws may be necessary in our current political climate as a means to counteract 
destructive messages.   
Laws have a vital norm-setting function, establishing boundaries of socially 
acceptable conduct. Thus, anti-hate laws may help create an environment in which people 
are free from words and actions that are demeaning, threatening, or that undermine full 
and equal citizenship. They have the potential to promote egalitarian attitudes, beliefs, 
behaviors, and social structures. These considerations are necessary for one to assess the 
equality-promoting benefits of regulating hate.  
c. Weighing the Burdens and Benefits of Criminalization 
Finally, once we have answered the questions above and enumerated the benefits and 
burdens of criminalization, we must weigh them to determine what approach best 
promotes racial equality. This is an impossibly difficult task, in part because the harms of 
either mass criminalization and hateful rhetoric and conduct are severe and substantial. 
Both involve loss of security caused by harassment. Both can result in extreme 
limitations on liberty due to fear or actual confinement. Both can result in stigma and 
reputational harm. Both involve extreme forms of discrimination. Both limit the ability of 
individuals to participate in social and civic life. Either can be accompanied by violence 
and psychological or physical trauma, even death. These negative effects ripple 
throughout the communities, as well, who suffer the loss of members or contend with 
these members when they return traumatized and handicapped by the experience. Both 
mass criminalization and unfettered hate create an environment wherein the targets are 
relegated to second-class citizenship, and both are incredibly corrosive to individual and 
community well-being. How can we prioritize one form of suffering over the other? This 
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dilemma is not one easily resolved. It has moral and ideological dimensions, and will 
require insights from multiple disciplines and stakeholders.  
IV.  Thinking Critically, Imaginatively, and Sociologically About Hate 
Recognizing this empirical inquiry could be misconstrued as an effort to undermine 
advocacy to address and eradicate hate, I wish to end by unambiguously articulating the 
intent behind, as well as the implications of, this research. This section highlights the 
crucial need to address hate, but encourages doing so through creative evidence-based 
approaches that do not perpetuate the injustices of mass criminalization.  
Why critique anti-hate enforcement? Perhaps every critical sociologist, at some point, 
faces reproach for critiquing institutions that enjoy broad unquestioning support. Whether 
the scrutiny focuses on gender, religion, capitalism, or the legal system, it is often met 
with strong resistance. Particularly during times of public panic and hysteria, there is 
great momentum towards taking action against perceived imminent dangers, and any 
criticism or concern raised is seen as a hindrance to those efforts and therefore a threat in 
and of itself. 
Some of the fiercest opposition to critical empirical inquiry can come from those with 
whom researchers share common ideals and objectives, who feel betrayed by the seeming 
divergence. These individuals may infer the logical conclusion of any critique is total 
obstruction. In other words, they adopt a mindset of ‘you’re either with us or against us,’ 
and assume that those who critique their efforts are naturally enemies.  
However, it is the job of a sociologist to be curious about social processes and social 
structures widely taken for granted, and to empirically test the underlying assumptions 
justifying the status quo. Those institutions that are widely accepted and celebrated are, 
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perhaps, those most needing critical examination, as they are least likely to be otherwise 
challenged, understood, and improved. Further, sociologists must situate phenomena 
within broader social and historical contexts to help the public see beyond the immediacy 
of current events and circumstances. These are fundamental premises of the sociological 
discipline, as articulated by canonical scholars like C. Wright Mills (1959).  
In this sociological tradition, I proposed a systematic empirical examination of anti-
hate laws. This project attempts to explore questions regarding how anti-hate laws 
actually operate in the real world, whether they function as expected, and the nature of 
their unintended consequences. I attempted to connect the current anti-hate regulatory 
policies to broader historical and contemporary patterns in the criminal justice system to 
provide a deeper understanding of the context in which these policies take place. The lack 
of sociological evidence or discussion was the impetus. 
By problematizing anti-hate laws and their enforcement, I do not suggest abandoning 
the struggle to address hate. Rather, I encourage us to think outside of the box and 
consider alternatives that may meet those interests without the deleterious effects. It is 
completely uncontroversial that hate and violence are destructive forces within our 
society that must end. However, we simply must rethink traditional punitive criminal 
justice strategies to the extent they fail to address these issues, particularly when the 
social and economic costs are so high. In the United States, we tend to address social 
problems – from addiction to violence to homelessness to gangs to terrorism to hate – by 
throwing the book at them. We look to the criminal justice system as the universal 
solution. However, time and again, it has proven itself unworthy of this faith, failing to 
address the underlying causes of these issues and, indeed, exacerbating them. Less-
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restrictive, proactive policies – like education, community-building, anti-poverty 
campaigns, and restorative justice – may have more meaningful, longer-lasting, positive 
impacts, without the negative consequences. We may face a false choice in deciding 
between mass criminalization and unencumbered hate. Collectively, we can generate 
more options than this. 
The ultimate goal of this project is to promote a theoretically and scientifically 
grounded approach to addressing hate. Accordingly, this research should not be construed 
as diminishing the severity or urgency of the threat and the need to act. In fact, it arises 
from a deep commitment to addressing the problem. Thus, this dissertation should be 
understood as a call for more curiosity, more research, more creativity, and more 
evidence-based policymaking. It is incumbent upon us as scholars, advocates, and 
citizens to end racial hierarchy, whether the culprits are private individuals or the 
government, hateful conduct or a flawed criminal justice system.  
V. Conclusion 
What is the role of government in addressing hateful expression or conduct? Does 
greater government intervention address racial subordination and persecution, thereby 
creating an environment in which equal citizenship can be realized? Alternatively, does 
invoking and empowering the government result in abuse of power and institutionalized 
racial repression? How can we effectively address hate and promote racial equality?   
This dissertation began an empirical quest to answer some of these questions, 
focusing particularly on who bears the burden of hate criminalization. The findings 
provide an important but modest contribution to the discussion. African Americans are 
most likely to be seen as hate criminals and, while they generally suffer from 
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disproportionately high arrest rates, the magnitude of this effect is significantly greater 
when police ascribe a hate motive. Further, there is reason to believe states may use hate 
crime protections to dominate and control African Americans advocating for social 
change and racial justice.  
While an important first step, these findings are limited. More research is needed to 
understand how criminal laws around hate are executed and whether racial disparities 
permeate the system. We have very little evidence regarding the relative efficacy of anti-
hate regulation in addressing bigotry and violence. Moreover, it is imperative we consider 
non-penal objectives, like establishing norms of inclusion and civility, when evaluating 
these efforts. Once all of the data is in, deeper analysis will be necessary to weigh the 
benefits and burdens of enforcement or the lack thereof, and to determine what best 
serves the interest of equality.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
INEQUALITY RATIOS 
 
1. Calculate income ratio: 
 African	Am.median	income-white	median	incomewhite	median	income   
 
A higher positive number indicates a greater disparity, with whites farther behind in 
income.  
 
2. Calculate the educational attainment ratio: 
 proportion	of	African	Am. population	w/o	bachelors	– 	proportion	of	white	population	w/o	bachelorsproportion	of	white	population	without	bachelors   
 
A higher positive number indicates a greater disparity, with African Americans farther 
behind in educational attainment. 
 
3. Calculate unemployment ratio 
 proportion	of	African	Am. population	unemployed	– 	proportion	of	white	population	unemployedproportion	of	white	population	unemployed	   
 
A higher number indicates a greater disparity, with African Americans experiencing 
higher unemployment. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
YEARLY RATES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST POLICE BY STATE 
 
Calculated by taking the number of assaults or murders of officers divided by the number 
of officers serving. 
 
Note: Data is complete for all years in all states. If a chart appears to miss a data point for 
assault rates for a given year, it means the rate was zero. 
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